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Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy

ROBERT J. ART

The United States and its NATO allies have gotten themselves into a real pickle. With their decision to enlarge NATO by taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, they have created three predicaments. Each is serious, none is easy to solve, and all require resolution.

The first predicament is: Where does enlargement stop? Who gets to join NATO and who does not? The weightiest members of the alliance have not determined in their own minds how many new members to take in. Yet, they have set in motion a process that is producing its own political momentum toward an ever-growing membership. Stopping expansion after one or two limited rounds, after all, will inevitably draw new lines in Europe, as those who do not want to be left out so potently argue. In response, NATO has declared that it is not in the business of drawing new such lines: "no more Yaltas" is the refrain now heard. Consequently, NATO has declared an open door membership policy: it will consider applications from any country that can meet the requirements for joining. If pursued to its logical end, this policy will convert NATO from an effective military alliance of limited membership into an entity of great size but with unclear function and effectiveness—perhaps an Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) with real military muscle, or perhaps another OSCE-like talk shop (see the third predicament below).

The second predicament is: How large can a NATO-without-Russia become before the West more or less permanently alienates Russia? Membership may indeed be open to all who qualify, but in practice neither Russian nor Ukrainian entry is in the cards for a long time. Taking in Ukraine without also inducting Russia is the quickest way to alienate Russia, because Russians across

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the political spectrum consider Ukraine to be part of Russia. Incorporating some of Mother Russia into NATO would justifiably give rise within Russia to fears of encirclement by, and exclusion from, the West. The same can be said for inducting the three Baltic states into NATO—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These, like Ukraine, were formerly part of the Soviet Union, not a part of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Taking Russia into NATO could well destroy American and allied support for the alliance. Unless the terms of NATO are changed, Russia's membership in NATO means that the United States is committed to defend it against all potential attackers, a large undertaking that not even the sole remaining superpower—and certainly not the United States Senate, as well as many of its allies—will blithely undertake. Thus, if Russia and Ukraine are ever to join NATO, they will be near the end, not the middle, of the queue.

Not to worry, we are told by the proponents of enlargement. NATO can expand without alienating Russia and endangering Ukraine. The special deals cut with these two—the Founding Act with Russia and the NATO-Ukraine Charter—will square the circle. Both states will be kept organically out of NATO but intimately tied to it.¹ As a result, Ukraine will feel more secure and Russia will have sway in NATO councils but without a veto over its actions. In Russia's case, in addition, Polish-Hungarian-Czech membership is said to be to Russia's advantage. Its western borders are made more secure and its own transition to democracy enhanced by having those three states solidly democratic and in NATO. By this line of reasoning, NATO can grow quite large, still exclude Russia, yet not alienate it.

The third predicament is: What will happen to NATO if it takes in a whole lot of new members? There are a slew of potential candidates: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are banging at the door and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright promised they would not be excluded; Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania have indicated their desire to join, but have been told to wait for the next round of expansion; Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and potentially Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia, none of which currently seek membership but might well should all the previous states get in; and finally, the former republics of the Soviet Union, all of whom are members of the OSCE, Europe's only pan-European-Central Asian, quasi-security institution. Can NATO take in all, most, or many of these states and still retain sufficient political cohesion and military readiness to be effective? Or will expansion beyond a certain point render it ineffective?

Not to worry, we are told. New members will not subtract from, but add to, NATO's effectiveness. First, NATO has expanded before without diluting it-

¹ The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The text can be found in *Arms Control Today* 27 (May 1997): 21–24. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on 9 July 1997. The text can be found in *NATO Review* 4 (July-August 1997): 5–6 of the special insert.

self. Originally comprised of twelve states when it was founded in 1949, NATO grew to sixteen members by the end of the cold war, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. If done properly and carefully, therefore, growth in size need not detract from NATO's functioning, as previous enlargements demonstrate. Second, states will be permitted to join only when they can meet NATO's military requirements. NATO will not be reduced to new members' standards; rather they will be brought up to NATO standards, thereby maintaining NATO's military effectiveness. Third, NATO's political cohesion will remain intact, because only democratic states will be permitted to join. Democracies are like-minded in their approach to security issues, and this will guarantee the consensus necessary to act when action is required. Fourth, NATO cannot stand still because conditions in Europe are changing. If NATO is to survive, it must adapt itself to the new security challenges. Defense of member territory is no longer the sole directive for NATO; now it must address instability within and among the newly-created states of Europe. This requires crisis prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking—missions that NATO has already begun to undertake. Fifth, new members will help NATO with its new tasks. A bigger alliance will be a more effective alliance, better at combatting instability, either because NATO permanently pacifies areas by incorporating them into its fold or because a bigger NATO has more resources and better geographic position from which to operate out of area. According to this line of reasoning, bigger is both necessary and better.

How big should NATO become? How much bigger can it get without provoking Russia? Will it get so big that it will choke on its own engorged membership? These are the predicaments that the yellow-brick-road of enlargement has created. All three are inextricably entangled; hence none can be solved in isolation from the others. All, moreover, require resolution, because the stakes are so high. NATO is the institutional repository for America's military ties to Europe, but it is also the keystone of America's global military role. If NATO is somehow gutted, the United States will likely withdraw militarily from Europe, revert to isolationism, or both—results not in Europe's, America's, or the world's best interests.

OPEN-DOOR MEMBERSHIP—A BAD SOLUTION

In their carefully reasoned and provocative article, Bruce Russett and Allan Stam address all three predicaments.² They tackle the second head on and argue that NATO enlargement will not only alienate Russia, but might also well drive it into China's arms, creating a formidable Sino-Russian alliance hostile to Western interests. To avoid either outcome, they prescribe inducting Russia into NATO in the next expansion, so long as Russia in their words "remains

² Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (Fall 1998): 361–382.

reasonably democratic.”³ They also argue that China should ultimately become a NATO member, because this is an effective way to avoid war with it and to manage its peaceful transition to superpower status. Russett and Stam also provide an explicit answer to the first predicament, taking the logical position that if Russia and China can join, why not any other state that qualifies. Hence their prescription: “NATO should expand to include anyone who meets the criteria. . . .”⁴

Their answer to the third predicament is also clear. To the question, “Can NATO remain effective if it becomes quite large?” their answer appears to be “yes.” As best I can figure it, their ultimate vision for NATO is that it transmutes itself by successive enlargements into a pan-Eurasian security organization of democratic states (or PESODS, my acronym) in which the United States, Canada, and Japan will also be members. Should this happen, PESODS will become either the military arm of, or an “essential supplement to,” the United Nations.⁵ If this vision comes to pass, then: “Ultimately, a great security management system might come to include all but the rogue states. In a sense, that would be the end of international political history.”⁶ A noble vision: a pan-continental NATO abolishes international politics as we have known it!

Noble as this vision for NATO may appear, I judge it to be profoundly misguided. The Russett-Stam prescription for open-door membership, which is also rhetorically NATO’s, is unwise. It makes a bad policy even worse, and I oppose it for three reasons.

First, it is not necessary to take Russia into NATO in order to avoid its estrangement, and especially to avert the danger Russett and Stam seem to fear so much—an anti-Western Russian-Chinese alliance. The levers to avoid Russia’s complete alienation from the West are more effective than Russett and Stam apparently think; Russia’s incentives not to sever its ties to the West are greater than they believe; and the incentives for China to enter such an alliance are weaker than they presume.

Second, it is risky to convert NATO into PESODS. To do so will replace an alliance that works well with something that is not likely to work nearly as well, if at all. Russett and Stam are too cavalier with their assumptions that PESODS can be made to work effectively and that the United States will readily support something that so vastly expands its military commitments.

Third, there is a better way to deal with Russia’s alienation: construct a viable, modern-day Concert of Europe. To work, such a concert requires that the United States take seriously the Founding Act between Russia and NATO and that it severely limit any expansion of NATO beyond the current round. If properly executed, this alternative is preferable to open-door membership, because it will preserve both the West’s ties to Russia and NATO’s effectiveness.

³ *Ibid.*, 362.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 382.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 380.

For these reasons, I find the open-door policy unnecessary and risky, and I believe there is a better way to manage, even if not solve, the predicaments created by enlargement.

THE LIMITS OF RUSSIAN-CHINESE COOPERATION

Has the current round of NATO enlargement already totally estranged Russia from the West? Will another round drive it headlong into alliance with China? The answers are not self-evident. In fact, there are three good reasons to believe that the current round, and even another limited round, will neither alienate Russia completely nor inevitably produce a hostile Russian-Chinese alliance. First, Russia cannot afford to cut its ties with the West; second, it does not need a military alliance with China to protect itself; and third, China's interests dictate against entry into an alliance aimed at the United States.

Russia's Need for the West

To begin with, Russia needs the West. If it is to become a full capitalistic democracy in a reasonable period of time and with as little pain as the situation permits, Russia requires the West's help—financial resources, technical and technological knowhow, and markets for Russia's raw materials and finished goods. A good case can be made that the West has not given enough financial assistance to help Russia make the transition from authoritarian communism to democratic capitalism, even though it has transferred at least \$60 billion to Russia since 1992.⁷ Valid though this case may be, it is a far cry from a situation in which the West gives Russia no help at all. That, however, would be the likely result of Russia's entry into a hostile alliance with China; and the consequent cessation of Western assistance would severely, if not catastrophically, harm Russia's economy. Russia's need for the West's assistance, therefore, constrains how much further beyond rapprochement it can go with China. While Russia has complained bitterly about NATO's enlargement, it has not taken steps that would irrevocably break its ties with the West. Russia's anti-enlargement rhetoric has far surpassed the concrete steps taken to counter it.⁸

⁷ From 1992–1996, the West committed through various sources over \$40 billion in aid, and in 1998 it put together an emergency package of another \$22 billion in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deal with the financial fallout Russia experienced from the Asian crisis. See Coit D. Blacker, "Russia and the West" in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 172; and Press Briefing by Stanley Fischer, first deputy managing director of the IMF, 13 July 1998 at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1998/tr_980713.htm.

⁸ As one example of the rhetoric, President Boris Yeltsin, according to the Associated Press, said on 6 May 1997: "We shall do everything to minimize the consequences of NATO expansion for Russia's security. We shall continue to deepen integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially with Belarus. We shall strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries, first of all with China." Quoted in Stanley Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity" in Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, eds., *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998), 136.

Russia's Nuclear Security

Russia's security does not rest on great power alliances. It does not need China to protect itself against an enlarged NATO or against any other great power. After all, Russia is a nuclear power, the next most formidable nuclear power in the world after the United States, and nuclear-armed states are rarely subject to massive attack by others. Russia's conventional forces may collectively constitute a basket case, but its nuclear force remains strong enough to deter attack or invasion from any great power. Thus, the prime incentive for Russia to enter into a military alliance with China—the need to protect itself against attack—is absent.⁹

Russett and Stam implicitly recognize this logic when they tell us why China should not fear a NATO that has inducted Russia into its fold. They argue: “As for potential Chinese fears, the Chinese have their deterrents against Russian or Western aggression. An invasion and occupation of China's vast territory and population is unimaginable, particularly by a NATO limited to a defense orientation.”¹⁰ But if this logic is good for China facing a NATO with Russia in it, why is it not equally valid for Russia facing NATO with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in it? Is Russia, too, not a “vast territory?” Does Russia not have its deterrents against “Western aggression?” Is NATO not as “limited to a defense orientation” with three Central European states in it as it would be with Russia in it? What, in sum, does a military alliance with China add to Russia's homeland security? The answer: very little. Therefore, as long as Russia maintains a second strike nuclear deterrent, it will be secure against any significant external attack.

To take this position, however, is not to dismiss the adverse political effects that enlargement has had on Russian-Western relations. The West has done itself no good by going through with a decision that is unpopular across the entire spectrum of Russian political opinion and that has complicated the life of pro-Western reformers who want to tie Russia closer to the West.¹¹ Except for those on the extreme right, Russians do not believe that the present enlarge-

⁹ William Wohlforth puts the matter well: “Officially and unofficially, Russians see no direct military threats for at least the next decade. . . . No power is thought to have interests that could lead to the direct use of force against Russian territory. . . . All sides—government and opposition, democrats and nationalists—agree that the probability of any direct security threat to Russia now or in the near future is low or nonexistent. The main threats are internal to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States and reflect uncontrolled processes or unintended consequences. . . . While politicians cannot resist the allure of nationalist great-power rhetoric, military and national security officials have dramatically lowered their threat assessments since 1992.” See William Wohlforth, “Redefining Security: Russia's Intellectual Adjustment to Decline,” *Harvard International Review* 29 (Winter 1996/1997): 59–60.

¹⁰ Russett and Stam, “Courting Disaster,” 368.

¹¹ Resentment against enlargement is not simply an elite affair. In a poll conducted before the enlargement agreement was signed, 51 percent of Russians polled saw NATO expansion as a serious threat and only 14 percent disagreed with that premise. See Susan Eisenhower, “The Perils of Victory” in Carpenter and Conry, *NATO Enlargement*, 114.

ment threatens their territory.¹² What they fear from enlargement is exclusion from the West, not attack by NATO. The European Union and NATO are two of the West's most important institutions, and membership in them rightly signifies full participation in Western affairs. Russians can therefore view their inability to join either as meaning that they are not considered worthy of full participation in the Western world.¹³ This sense of exclusion is a serious issue. It is not serious enough to create a Sino-Russian alliance, but it is serious enough to complicate American foreign policy in many other ways unless countermeasures are taken. I offer one in the last section of this article.

China's Independent Foreign Policy

China is not likely to join Russia in an alliance directed against the United States solely because NATO gets bigger. Therefore, even if I am wrong and Russia decides to woo China ardently, a military alliance between the two is still not likely to be consummated. It takes two to make an alliance, and China's current and foreseeable interests strongly militate against it, particularly as long as the United States continues to play its cards more wisely in East Asia than it has so far in Europe. Thus, even if Russia comes to want such an alliance, China in all likelihood would reject it. A look at the factors behind the rapprochement between Russia and China will help explain why.

The current rapprochement is a normalization of relations, not a strategic partnership aimed at the United States.¹⁴ Russia and China have cooperated

¹² Again, Wohlforth puts the point well: ". . . The overwhelming majority of Russia's policy elite sees NATO expansion as detrimental to Russia's security interests and as evidence of a policy failure of major proportions. Only the most committed of Westernizers can view NATO expansion with equanimity. However, even strident opponents of the move do not see it as motivated by any immediate designs on Russia, and their opinions vary on the actual significance of the security threat it implies." See Wohlforth, "Redefining Security," 59.

¹³ As one Russian scholar, Irina Zhinkina, put it: "How come that the new Russia, which has discarded its former ideology, remembered God, sworn loyalty to the new ideals of democracy and fallen into the embrace of its recent 'probable adversaries' is not accepted [sic] to Western civilization. What else must it do?" Quoted in Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity," 135–136.

¹⁴ Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., *Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40–126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," *Harvard International Review* 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28–35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," *SAIS Review* 16 (1996): 1–19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in *Asian Survey* 33 (March 1993): 272–284 and 285–302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16–62 and 63–107.

with one another since the end of the cold war for three main reasons. First is the mutual desire to settle their long-standing border conflict in the Far East. Second is a shared approach toward Central Asia—having the borders of the new Central Asian states stable and secure, limiting ethnic separatism and their support of cross-border independence movements, and combatting the perceived Islamic fundamentalist threat from the south. Last are the mutually beneficial gains that are realized from China's purchases of Russian arms. A fourth factor—the desire to counter America's predominance—has played a part, but only a bit part, in the cooperation the two states have forged to date.

The drive to normalize their relations predates the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev began the normalization process in the mid-1980s as part of his “new thinking” in foreign policy. He matched the goal of ending the cold war in the West with sustained efforts to end the long-standing Sino-Soviet conflict in the East. Tentative agreement on the eastern Sino-Soviet border was reached in 1987 and the Gorbachev-Deng Xiaoping summit in May 1989 formally ended the Sino-Soviet conflict. Throughout the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin continued Gorbachev's normalization policy, partly out of Russia's general weakness, partly out of the central government's concern for the vulnerability of its far eastern provinces, which it could no longer wall off from outside influences as the Soviet government did, and partly out of a desire to reduce Russia's military burden. China was open to these overtures, partly because of its desire to reduce its military burden on the northern border, partly to engage in profitable commerce with Russia's far eastern provinces, and partly from its general desire to maintain stable relations with both Russia and the United States so as to be hostage to neither.¹⁵ Each government felt another powerful pressure to settle their border dispute: the concern each has about center-periphery relations. Both governments are worried about the potential erosion of their control over their respective provinces and regions. The last thing each wants is turmoil along the shared border. For all these reasons, both have had strong incentives to settle the matter.

Over the last six years, China and Russia have reached two important agreements: one demarcating the border between them in the Far East and another demilitarizing it one-hundred kilometers on either side.¹⁶ To date, the border issue has not been completely solved, but now it is only a minor irritant in Sino-Russian relations.

In Central Asia, Russia and China have reached a *modus vivendi* based on an overlap of interests. Both states have favored secure and stable borders for the five new states born from the Soviet Union's disintegration. Russia is concerned about the threat that Islamic fundamentalism from the South could have on its own considerable Muslim population, and it is also determined to keep

¹⁵ See Nathan and Ross, *Great Wall*, chap. 3, for a good overview of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian relations since 1950.

¹⁶ For details on the agreements and their negotiating history, as well as the issues still outstanding, see Anderson, *Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, chap. 2.

the region within its sphere of influence. China is concerned about its hold over its western province of Xinjiang and, therefore, worries about the threat posed by the Uighurs living in Kazakhstan who favor a Xinjiang independence movement. The Uighurs are the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang. China is also concerned about Islamic fundamentalism in general. China has accepted for the time being Russia's political-military predominance in the region, and in return it has benefited from Russia's efforts to create stable borders and control cross-border independence movements along the periphery of the former Soviet Union.

China's purchases of Russian arms help modernize China's military, which is badly in need of modernization. But they also help Russia's military-industrial complex, which cannot survive, much less produce the next generation of military equipment, on the orders of the Russian military alone. As a consequence, transfers of technology and equipment began in 1992, and since then Russia has sold to China advanced electronics, air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, armored fighting vehicles, T-72 tanks, and Su-27 fighters. Russia is now China's largest source of modern arms, providing nearly 70 percent of China's arms imports in 1996.¹⁷ All these considerations have led to a rapprochement in Sino-Russian relations that was much overdue.

Underneath the cooperation in these areas, however, are conflicts, latent and real, and mutual wariness. Russia's provision of advanced military equipment to China is a two-edged sword, especially since China seeks transfers of technology so that it can produce its own advanced weapons. China is a rising power; Russia is a declining one. Arming a rising power only hastens its rise. Russians in the Far East worry about the huge demographic asymmetry between them and the Chinese contiguous to them. There are eight million Russians in the Russian Far East and 120 million Chinese nearby, giving rise in those Russian provinces to fears of Sinicization of the Russian Far East through cross-border trade and illegal immigration. China is becoming an economic competitor to Russia in Central Asia, seeking to revive the old silk road and looking to tap into the huge Caspian energy reserves. China has become Kazakhstan's second most important export market. It is on the verge of surpassing Russia as the dominant supplier of light-industrial products to the whole region, and it has joined with Western and Japanese companies in exploring pipeline construction out of the Caspian area. The states of Central Asia, seeking to free themselves of Russian predominance, welcome the Chinese (and the Western and Japanese) presence. These considerations are not sufficient to break the current cooperation between Russia and China, but neither are they so weak as to provide no resistance against the signing of a firm military alliance between the two.¹⁸

¹⁷ Garnett, "Slow Dance," 30–31; and Anderson, *Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, 36.

¹⁸ On these matters, see Garnett, "The Russian Far East"; Nathan and Ross, *Great Wall*, 48–55; Peter Pavilions and Richard Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia," *Harvard International Review* 28 (Winter 1996/97): 24–27 and 62–65; and Stephen J. Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals," *Central Asian Survey* 14 (1995): 373–406.

Concern about “American hegemonism” has played little, if any, role in the Sino-Russian normalization. The border agreements reached by the two states tackled problems that needed tackling. The Central Asian *modus vivendi* and the arms purchases satisfied the interests of the two powers, independent of their concerns about the United States. Normalization would have occurred in the absence of these concerns, and the best proof available is that it began before the Soviet Union disintegrated and left the United States as the world’s dominant power. It was Gorbachev’s drive to end the Sino-Soviet conflict, not America’s emergence as the sole superpower, that jump-started Sino-Russian normalization, that obviated China’s need to cooperate with the United States against Soviet hegemonism, and that made possible (although not inevitable) the current Sino-Russian rapprochement.

Does this mean that in the 1990s Russia and China have had no concerns at all about America’s singular superpower status? Clearly not. Both share such concerns, and the two proclaimed a strategic partnership in April 1996. Russian foreign policy took a less Western and more balanced turn in late 1994, after the United States declared that it intended to expand NATO. Under Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, who took over in January 1996, Russia has tried to create counterweights to the United States by cultivating ties with China, India, and Iran.¹⁹ Practically overnight in April 1996, China agreed to a strategic partnership, in part because of the after-effects of the Taiwan Straits standoff in March 1996 and the reaffirmation of the U.S.–Japan treaty in April. Clearly, America’s actions in Europe and East Asia have had something to do with the creation of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

For our purposes, however, the important point about this partnership is not its existence, but its meaning. Russia and China view it differently. Russia makes it out to be much more important than does China, and Russia has been the suitor in trying to move the relationship beyond normalization to something more potent. China has been resistant. Jennifer Anderson, a close observer of Sino-Russian relations, makes this clear:

China’s leaders have been far more cautious [about the strategic partnership], repeatedly playing down elements of the relationship and placing it in the context of longer-standing traditions of adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and aversion to bloc or alliance politics. Jiang’s agreement to upgrade links from “constructive” to “strategic” partnership on 24-hours’ notice, rather than seeking agreement from other Chinese leaders, appears to confirm that no significant departure from China’s foreign-policy stance of independence and pragmatism has taken place. . . . Although Jiang has agreed to describe relations as a “strategic partnership,” China has often backed away from Russian definitions of what this actually means. . . . Jiang described links with the US as a “strategic partnership” after a trip there in October 1997.²⁰

¹⁹ See Blacker, “Russia and the West,” 178–188.

²⁰ Anderson, *Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, 24.

Russia and China differ in how far each is prepared to go in offsetting American power. China wants Russian arms, stable borders, and secure peripheries; but it is wary of Russia's attempt to make more of their cooperation than that. Although Russia wants strategic partnership, China stops at normalization.

Unless current conditions change dramatically, there are four good reasons why China will not allow the current rapprochement to transmute into a military alliance directed against the United States. First, China needs American investment and especially access to America's market to help it modernize. China has a favorable balance of trade with the United States that is second only to Japan's and that often runs neck and neck with it on a monthly basis. No country takes as many Chinese goods as does the United States, and no other country, especially Russia, is placed to do so, should the United States severely restrict China's access to its market. China will not sacrifice its access to America's market simply because Russia wants an alliance with it. Just as is the case for Russia, therefore, China's need for the American market and American investment puts limits on how closely it will cooperate militarily with Russia against the United States.

Second, China no more wants to be under Russia's thumb than under America's. China's goal is an independent foreign policy. It will use Russia to offset the United States, the United States to offset Russia, and both to offset Japan, when circumstances require it. The drive to be independent is powerful in China, especially given its experience with Western, Russian, and Japanese colonialism.

Third, China does not need an alliance with Russia to secure itself against the United States. China, like Russia, is a nuclear power, not as powerful as either Russia or the United States, but a nuclear power nonetheless. Just as Russia does not need China to secure itself against an American-led NATO invasion, so China does not need Russia to secure itself against an American invasion.

Fourth, China's attitude toward a military alliance with Russia will be determined by what happens in Asia, not in Europe. It stretches credulity to believe that China will sign a full-blown, anti-American military alliance with Russia because NATO takes in Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and even the Baltic States and Ukraine. China may consider itself a global power, but its vital interests and core security concerns lie in Asia, not in Europe. Therefore, what the United States does in Asia, particularly in northeast, east, and southeast Asia, not what it does in western and central Europe, will govern how closely China moves towards military cooperation with Russia.

This, then, is the key. It is in America's, not Russia's hands to determine whether China moves from a vague, if not meaningless strategic partnership with Russia into an anti-American military alliance. The United States could bring a military alliance about by pursuing a stupid policy in East Asia. It could, for example, support independence for Taiwan, which it does not. It could move American troops up close to the Yalu when Korea unites, which it should

not. It could push the Japanese to patrol aggressively close to Chinese waters, which it dare not. Short of this sort of bungling by the United States, Russia and China will cooperate when their interests dictate, but that cooperation will remain short of a firm and hostile military alliance directed against the United States and its allies.

China is the rising power; Russia, the declining one. As the declining power, Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. The only way China will need Russia as much as Russia appears to need China is if the United States takes steps to drive it into Russia's waiting arms. Therefore, the United States should make certain that it does not commit the blunders in Asia to produce such an outcome.

PESODS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF NATO

The second reason to oppose the open-door membership policy is that it will destroy NATO and replace it with something that will work far less well to keep Eurasia stable. If PESODS ever does emerge, it will be too unwieldy to be effective. NATO is too valuable to sacrifice on the altar of what is essentially a putative collective security organization.

PESODS' problem is one of size and scale. When an alliance expands to the number of states and territorial scope that Russett and Stam contemplate for NATO, it will then take on many of the fatal defects that plague a collective security organization (CSO).²¹ In all fairness, Russett and Stam do not call their ultimate vision for NATO "collective security," but the functions that they appear to attribute to it make PESODS look pretty much like a CSO. In analyzing what alliances such as NATO do, they state: "Any defensive alliance serves two purposes. The first is to prevent an external power from trying to alter the international territorial status quo. The second is to prevent any of the member states from wishing to do the same."²² An alliance is directed primarily against the first contingency and is concluded by states that usually have a specific enemy or enemies in mind. If the alliance is working, however, it will also deal effectively with the second contingency as well, as Russett and Stam point out, even though there is no formal alliance obligation to do so. After all, to deter or defeat an attack against the alliance, its members must be united, not fighting amongst themselves.²³

²¹ Good analyses of why collective security organizations do not work can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 412–418; Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 5; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," *Survival* 34 (Spring 1992): 36–51; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/95): 26–37.

²² Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 380.

²³ NATO performed both these functions throughout the cold war. It was an alliance directed against the Soviet Union, but it also prevented conflict among its members, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus notwithstanding. Through NATO the United States placed a substantial fraction of its cold war military machine in Western Europe, concentrated it in West Germany, and thereby reas-

By contrast, a genuine CSO is designed to deal explicitly with aggression from both external powers and CSO members. The contracting parties enter a CSO with no specific aggressor state in mind, or to put the point differently, with all potential aggressor states in mind. A CSO's central goal is to deter attack upon any of its members; but if deterrence for some reason fails, it will defend that member. If a CSO works as intended, however, defensive operations should not have to be mounted because attacks will not occur. Deterrence will be highly effective because all potential aggressors know that punishment of aggression will be certain, swift, and overwhelming. It is the automaticity of punishment that is designed to dissuade aggressors from attacking. Hence if a CSO works, aggression and war within its domain will not happen.

Alliances are more qualified than genuine CSOs in the degree to which they bind their member states to render military aid to the victims of aggression. Alliances qualify their commitments either by retaining national control over the decision to use force, or by clearly specifying the exact circumstances under which military aid shall be rendered, or by doing both.²⁴ What an alliance gives up in certainty of response, however, should be more than compensated for by the strength and intensity of the interest its member states have in preventing a specific aggressor from attacking them. By narrowing its scope (the range of aggressions it seeks to prevent), an alliance thereby strengthens its deterrent power. If it works well, an alliance should be as effective at deterring specific potential aggressors as a genuine CSO is in deterring all potential aggressors.

These foregoing differences between traditional military alliances and genuine CSOs begin to narrow as a defensive alliance grows in size. As it increases the number of members and the geographic scope of operations, the alliance gradually loses its restrictive character and begins to take on the attributes of a CSO. More states and greater territorial coverage mean more contingencies to guard against. The eventual result is that member states have pledged military assistance to prevent circumstances that are more and more remote from their central interests. When the alliance becomes quite large, then the member states are put in the position of guaranteeing practically everyone against prac-

sured Germany's allies that it would not revert to its aggressive past. "Keeping Russia out, Germany down, and the United States in" was how these two (or three) functions were usually described.

²⁴ In the Washington Treaty that created NATO, the signators did not formally qualify the enemy against whom the alliance was directed, although all knew it was the Soviet Union. The treaty did, however, retain for the member states the right of national control over the use of force, thereby rendering military assistance not automatic, but contingent upon national decision. This was the price to be paid in order to get the Washington Treaty through the United States Senate. The text of the treaty makes the point clear. By Article 5, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." By Article 11, however, the members provided a safety catch: "This Treaty shall be ratified and *its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.*" (Emphasis added.) The Washington Treaty text can be found in NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, 1995), 231–235.

tically everything. If the alliance becomes all inclusive for a particular region, it transmutes into a regional CSO.

Because of the eventual size contemplated for PESODS, we can legitimately consider it a regional CSO that covers most of Eurasia, Japan, and North America. The problem with PESODS, however, is that it will be too large to work as Russett and Stam intend. There are three reasons why.

First, PESOD's large size will inhibit the development of the necessary consensus for action. Russett and Stam miss the point when they argue: "the bigger the alliance becomes, the less is the burden on any single state and the greater the security provided."²⁵ The correct statement would be: "the bigger the alliance becomes, the more difficult it is to develop consensus for military action, and the less secure all states will then feel."²⁶ States are not likely to honor their commitments to aid one another with force if the possible range of both geographical action and military contingencies is so large that they in effect are guaranteeing everyone against everything. States have never been prepared to give such open-ended guarantees in the past. Why should we expect them to do so now?

For those who argue that democracies will operate differently and achieve the consensus necessary to act, go study the record on Bosnia. The Western Europeans were at loggerheads with one another and with the United States over what to do in Bosnia, and they all were at loggerheads with Russia. Had the United States not seized the leadership role in 1995, NATO would never have undertaken the air strikes against the Serbs in the summer of 1995 that helped bring the Bosnian war to an end. At the time, America's French and British allies were opposing any NATO military actions that could threaten the lives of their peacekeepers who were operating under United Nations auspices in Bosnia. Furthermore, had Russia then been a member of NATO, the alliance would never have launched these air strikes. Russia was opposing the air strikes because it consistently favored the Serbs over the Bosnian Muslims. Roughly the same pattern—allied dissensus and Russia's Serbian bias—has been repeated in the tragedy now taking place in Kosovo.

The first lesson of the Bosnian case is, therefore, this—democratic states find it hard to achieve consensus on taking military action when their own immediate security is not at stake. Just because democracies can agree not to fight with one another does not mean they will invariably agree to fight together in alliance against outsiders. Peacelike in their relations toward one another, there is no guarantee they will be warlike in unison toward others.

The second useful lesson has to do with the role that dominant actors play in security organizations. The United States was essential to produce effective NATO military action. America's ability to dominate NATO wrested the air

²⁵ Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 381.

²⁶ For the argument that collective action problems will prevent even the NATO of present size from engaging in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, see Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," *International Security* 23 (Summer 1998): 78–107.

strikes from the alliance. Without the United States, NATO would not have acted as decisively as it eventually did. There is thus an important point here: if American power is diluted because a large number of states are added to NATO, especially powerful ones like Russia, then effective action will be that much harder for the leader to produce.²⁷ The Bosnian case demonstrates how essential a dominant actor is in order to get effective military action out of a security organization, whether it be an alliance or a CSO.

The third lesson has to do with the ability of powerful actors to concert their actions. Bosnia lies in an area of the Balkans that both Russia and the United States claim to be within their sphere of influence. The area is thus a shared sphere, and the United States and Russia each had to take the interests of the other into account. The United States had the upper hand because it dominated NATO, because British and French troops were already on the ground, and because Russia was militarily weak. The United States was therefore able to get more of what it wanted than Russia could, but it still did not get all that it wanted because Russia retained the ability to thwart NATO action by sending military supplies to the Serbs if NATO went too far. Imagine how PESODS would operate in those parts of Eurasia that even a democratic Russia would consider its exclusive sphere, and then add to that picture a Russia that is much more powerful militarily than it now is, because some day in the future it will be.

The second reason why PESODS will not work is that when consensus on action becomes difficult or impossible to achieve, then the signatories' pledge of military assistance becomes problematic. When that happens, the member states will no longer be able to count on each other if they are attacked. That is fatal to a security organization, whether it be an alliance or a CSO, because their *raison d'être* is the guarantee of military assistance. The military guarantee cannot be a sometimes affair. If it is perceived as such, then the member states will put little or no trust in the security organization, and one of two things, or both, will happen. Either the member states will fend for themselves, or they will seek out those few states upon whom they can rely. If the former occurs, the alliance or CSO collapses; if the latter, a new alliance is in effect formed. Both fates would likely befall PESODS.

The third reason why PESODS will not work has to do with the interests of the United States. As argued above, for an alliance or a CSO to work, the strongest military power (there always is one) must back the organization. For PESODS, under current and foreseeable circumstances, that power is the United States. The problem is that the United States will not back PESODS

²⁷ Adding Russia to NATO is not popular with the European members of NATO. David Yost, a close observer of European security affairs, cites German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe's views, made clear in September 1994, as representative of European views on adding Russia: "Russia cannot be integrated, neither [sic] into the European Union nor into NATO. . . . If Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. . . . It would be like the United Nations of Europe—it wouldn't work." Quoted in David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security," *Survival* 40 (Summer 1998): 139.

fully. How can we expect the United States to agree to make or fulfill military promises that guarantee, in effect, all qualifying states in Eurasia? Americans may not presently know the difference between Slovakia, Slovenia, and Slavonia, but if they find their young men and women dying in any of those places in significant numbers, they will quickly consult the map and wonder why their leaders have put them in harm's way in such places. Because America's leaders know this will happen, they will not send them there in the first place. Bosnia sold in Peoria, partly because the fighting stopped before Americans were sent in and partly because the Balkans is right next door to Western Europe. Bosnia-like actions further afield will not sell so well. Imagine an American president going on national television to try to convince the American people that if PES-ODS is to have credibility, then the United States must help defend Russia against a Chinese attack to reclaim Bolshoy Ussuriisk and Tarabarov—two islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, which were left out of the 1991 border agreement between Russia and China.

The bottom line is that a security entity of the size and scale that Russett and Stam envision will founder on the same shoals as did the League of Nations and the United Nations. Neither of these were set up as genuine collective security organizations, because their member states did not want them to be. They refused to yield the right of national decision on the use of force to either organization, and instead retained national control.²⁸ This had the effect of making these two institutions imperfect CSO's, thereby rendering the use of force problematic in both. As a consequence, the combined track record of the League and the United Nations for collective security enforcement (punishment of aggression) is poor. Of the thirty-two interstate wars between 1922 and 1991, the League and the United Nations attempted collective enforcement only three times. The first—League action against Italy in 1936—was a disaster. The next two—UN action in Korea in 1950 and UN action in the Gulf in 1991—were American-led and American-run affairs.²⁹ Three attempts out of thirty-two, with one failure and two questionable collective actions, is not a decisive endorsement for collective security.

Exactly the same fate will befall NATO if it is made too large. Its military guarantee, which is the heart of the alliance, will be effectively diluted. Either the member states will formally water it down as NATO enlarges, or they will not honor their military guarantee when their interests dictate ignoring it. Security will no longer be a collective but a divisible enterprise; and at that point, PESODS will be effectively neutered, and NATO will have been destroyed.

²⁸ On this point, See Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 298–311.

²⁹ The first action effectively destroyed the League. The second took place only because the Soviet Union happened to boycott the Security Council meeting on the day that the action was voted. The third was another American-run affair, which the UN essentially delegated to the United States and its NATO-Arab allies. The thirty-two interstate wars for these seventy years can be found in "Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816–1992," (ICPR 9905), Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 1994.

A CONCERT OF EUROPE—THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE

There is a better way to deal with the predicaments created by NATO's first round of post-cold war enlargement. It is to limit severely any further expansion and to take seriously the Founding Act. The first step is the prerequisite to the second. If both are taken, there is the chance to create a viable Concert of Europe. To be sure, this will be an imperfect arrangement, but it is the best option that we have to create a workable security structure for all of Europe.³⁰

NATO's expansion must be limited and, preferably, stopped, if Russia's cooperation is to be secured. No European-wide structure will succeed if in the process of creating it, Russia is estranged or, worse yet, made an implacable enemy. Yet that is exactly what the United States and its allies risk if they next induct the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO. According to Anatol Lieven, an experienced correspondent for the *Financial Times* in Moscow and Central Europe, Boris Yeltsin is on record as stating that if NATO takes in any of the former Soviet republics, that will be cause for abrogating the Founding Act and will lead to a complete breakdown of Russia's relations with the West.³¹ The same result is nearly as likely if many more states are inducted but Russia continues to be excluded. The larger NATO grows without Russia, the more apparent it becomes that Russia is being discriminated against. Thus, if the Founding Act is to be used as the institutional hook to draw Russia into a cooperative security arrangement with the West, then it is the height of stupidity to take steps that would cause Russia to abrogate it.

If further expansion of NATO without Russia risks alienating it, then the West faces two choices. Either it closes the barn door for a long time after taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, or it makes a second round of expansion, if political expediency requires another one sometime soon, as innocuous as possible by taking in only a few states and only those that are noncontroversial, such as Slovenia, Austria, and Sweden. The states of Europe that lie in the contested zone—such as Finland, the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia, Macedonia—must understand that they have no God-given right to NATO membership. Furthermore, they must be made to understand that NATO expansion beyond a certain size risks bringing on two scenarios: the one they fear most—a Russia hostile to them; and the one they think about least but which is equally bad for them—an ineffective NATO. If

³⁰ Some may argue that Europe does not need such a structure. Others may argue that if it does, the United States need not be part of it. Still others may argue that the West does not need to take Russia's concerns into account. I do not think that Russett and Stam hold to any of these views, and neither do I. Our differences, therefore, center on the means to attain the end I believe we three share—to keep Europe as stable, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic as possible. For my views on the role of the United States in European affairs, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Spring 1996): 1–39; and on Eurasia in general, Robert J. Art, *Selective Engagement: An American Grand Strategy* (forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 7.

³¹ Anatol Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution" in Carpenter and Conry, *NATO Enlargement*, 144.

these nonmember states cannot, for understandable historic reasons, comprehend these two dangers, then the United States together with its Western allies must make the facts of Realpolitik life clear to them, instead of catering to their historic nightmares and pandering to America's manifold European ethnic groups, as has been the case to date. These states must be made to understand that their security is better off with a viable NATO that they cannot join than with one that is not viable but to which they belong. The latter will do them no good whatsoever, but there is always the chance that the former can do them some good.³² An alliance that works well is better than a CSO that works poorly or not at all.

The second step in creating a workable concert is to integrate Russia more fully into the deliberations of the other European great powers. The mechanism to do this has been set up: it is called the Founding Act. Now what is required is to make certain that it is treated seriously. The West should not view the Act as a sop to sell the first round of expansion to Russian public opinion, but instead should make it the institutional centerpiece of Russian-Western consultation and cooperation on security matters of common concern. The OSCE cannot serve this function. It is too large. With fifty-three member states, almost all of whom have equal say in any dispute, consensus on action is too difficult to produce. This is not to denigrate the OSCE. It has performed many useful functions since the cold war ended, such as preventive diplomacy and election monitoring, but concertation of the great powers for the use of force is not one of them. Instead, the West should attempt to institutionalize NATO-Russian security cooperation through systematic use of the Founding Act. This is possible because NATO contains all the great powers of Europe; the United States is still its acknowledged political-military leader and can use its leadership to help forge consensus; and NATO is still small enough and the habits of consultation strong enough that concertation of Western action is possible. What now has to happen is to bring Europe's other remaining great power—Russia—into this consultative Western process without destroying it.

To achieve this goal, the West should view the NATO-Russian accord as an attempt to construct the twenty-first-century equivalent of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe.³³ The defining characteristic of the first concert was

³² Through its Partnership for Peace program (PFP), NATO has made a vague commitment to PFP members: "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security." This is not a defense pledge, but neither is it meaningless. It leaves the door open for NATO to decide whether it wants to aid a state under duress or attack. See Yost, "The New NATO," 144.

³³ My proposal for a modern day Concert parallels in some respects that of Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan. They want to institutionalize great power concertation in the CSCE, effectively turning it into a formal collective security system by creating a security council of the five great powers. I do not think this is politically feasible, because forty-eight smaller powers of Europe and Central Asia will resist it. I also believe that collective security will not work for the reasons set forth earlier. My proposal, which is NATO's at least on paper, keeps cooperation looser and does not promise what cannot be delivered. For the details of what the revamped OSCE would look like, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,"

the agreement among the European great powers not to take unilateral advantage of unstable situations in order to improve their positions vis-à-vis one another. Instead, they all agreed to concert their actions so as to attain the shared goal of preserving the peace. The concertation of action took place in formal conferences that met periodically, at least in the early years of the Concert. Extensive consultation, the reaching of a consensus on action, and joint action were the *modus operandi* of the first concert.³⁴

In its rhetoric and provisions, the Founding Act makes the same commitment to concerting action between NATO and Russia: "the shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible." The basis for joint action is "their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples." The goals are defined as "inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area" based on the "principles of democracy and cooperative security." The Act devises a mechanism to bring all this about: "the Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability" and its activities "will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency." Finally, there is an implicit recognition of spheres of influence and an explicit injunction against giving Russia a veto power over NATO deliberations: "The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia," and "Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other . . . nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action."³⁵ Thus, the intent to foster a European great power concert based on NATO-Russian cooperation is imbedded in the Founding Act. What remains is to implement it.

This would-be modern day concert may not achieve the same degree of coordination that the earlier one did. In spite of a lot of fuzzy rhetoric about it, we must remember that the first concert was, after all, a mechanism devised by the monarchs and aristocrats of the great powers to preserve their dynastic necks and their privileged lives. Their purpose in devising a concert of monarchies was to prevent interstate war so as to suppress revolution, because they had learned the hard way from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era (1792–1815) that war brought revolution. Their concert worked so well for so long because the horrors of the 1792–1815 period were seared into their collective heads.

International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 151–160. For a solution that closely parallels mine, see Yost, "The New NATO."

³⁴ A good overview of the first Concert of Europe is found in Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 58–79.

³⁵ Quotes are from the text of the Preamble and Sections 1–3 of the Founding Act, found in *Arms Control Today*, 21–23.

Can the twenty-first century version of the European concert work as smoothly for as long? No one can answer the question with certainty now. It depends on a host of important factors—the course of events in Russia, the nature and extent of American leadership, the evolution of the European Union, and the political cohesion of NATO, to name but a few. Concerts, just like alliances, however, work best when consensus among the concerting powers or allies is high. Consensus depends in good part on a preexisting set of common interests among states, which are usually produced by a conjunction of historical events and powerful underlying international conditions. This was certainly the case for the nineteenth-century concert, which was born out of the maelstrom of nearly twenty-five years of continuous great power war. But concerts do not come into existence solely because of shared underlying interests, even though this is the most important factor in their creation. Leadership and institutions can play a role in helping to forge the sense of shared interests. This was true of Europe's first concert; it is equally valid for the present putative one.

CONCLUSION

Three final points need to be made. First, building the modern concert with Russia through the Founding Act requires that Russian interests and perspectives will have to be taken into account. This does not mean giving Russia a veto over NATO's decisions as some have argued, but it does mean taking its views seriously and making compromises when deemed necessary. Any attempt at a European-wide security structure, whether fashioned from PES-ODS, the present day OSCE, or the Founding Act, will have to take into account the interests of its weightiest members; otherwise it will not work. Concerts mean that great powers act collectively when they can agree to do so; and when they cannot, they act separately. NATO and Russia should act together when they can agree to do so; they will act separately when they cannot.

Second, the attempt to fashion the twenty-first century Concert of Europe out of the Founding Act may well fail. In that case, NATO remains to provide security for Western Europe and the hope of protection for the areas of Europe that do not belong to it. Should Russia turn aggressive, NATO can always expand to protect those areas it wants to protect, or give military equipment and advice and even send combat forces to those areas it chooses to protect but not incorporate. This is a fall-back position should the Concert attempt fail and Russia turn nasty.

Third, what should be patently clear is that no concert based on the Founding Act will come into existence unless NATO remains viable. Because of the American guarantee to its members' security, NATO provides important reassurance to its members, helps stabilize relations among all but one of Europe's great powers (and arguably helps stabilize relations with Russia, too), creates transparency and integrated military planning, and promotes common politi-

cal-military approaches to crises. No other security institution in Europe does all these things, and in my view no other one that analysts may devise or that currently exists will do so for the foreseeable future. These are the reasons why NATO is so valuable to any European-wide security structure. Whatever it ultimately looks like, such a structure must be grafted onto NATO, not NATO absorbed into it.

In sum, at this time, there is a window of opportunity in Europe for concert construction. The United States should seize it, exercise leadership, and use the Founding Act as the vehicle to build the second Concert of Europe.*

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