I agree that a nation ran by a single party who holds complete control of every key institution that can bring about change will lead to a greater division between the nation itself - e.g. the Russian who didn't have party membership, and the ruling class. However, it is worth noting that you are especially right in the following:
>And this competition had it's rules - who more powerfull and can control more, have more friends and "allies" - get this powers.
>And now, after some time you got people who was raised up in this system, and seriously beliving in all this propoganda bullshit that after stalin dont even remotly had connection to reality, and tried to act like if propoganda was reality.
Well, the idea of Gorbachev being overly optimistic and idealistic is correct. The Soviet experience and Soviet education naturally took its effect on the political perceptions of every man, woman and child of the Soviet Union, creating a post-Soviet society that is something that morphed out of a failed social experiment. All nations change based on their history, but all СНГ countries show that the Soviet collapse is still a very defining event in their present political configuration. It's easy to understand how a man who rose up the party ranks via the Komsomol would have some degree of loyalty to the system imprinted him, and be unable to throw away the entirety of the Bolshevik revolution as a way of cleansing it from sins he saw present in this megalith.
On the idea however of Gorbachev being a "true believer" of the soviet line is doubtful. It is hard to pin his political beliefs exactly in during the last years of the Soviet Union, particularly between 1889 to 1991. Note that during his leadership Gorbachev went from being a man who genuinely believed the Prague Spring should have been avoided and that was when socialism went afoul to seemingly denying the entire canon of Marxism-Leninism and seeing it as an unnecessary burden on the people of the Soviet Union.
>or delusional people like Gorbachov who belived in cloud castles that never existed exept deep imagination of enthusisats of XIX-earlyXX centuary who disappointed in their belifs pretty fast when it comes to physical reality.
Well, consider that Gorbachev used to be a Stalinist combine operator who despite having his grandparents suffer through Stalin's kulak purges genuinely believed he had Stalin to thank for his happy childhood. In 1983, Gorbachev was at the helm of the Soviet Agriculture and when in Canada to meet the Canadian minister agriculture of Agriculture, Gorby had to wait because the Canadian Minister was late. Alongside with Yakovlev (the Soviet ambassador to Canada) who had gone with him, they went for a walk and decided to talk about their thoughts on the present state of the Soviet regime. Somehow, these two apparatchiki were entirely honest with each other in regards to how the system was rotten and what genuinely needed to be done to fix. Gorbachev enjoyed speaking to this man and would later appoint him as a key advisor in Perestroika (before letting him resign at the behest of hardliners in his attempts to prevent a putsch).
A man who served under Brezhnev and had to talk to a man that was practically senile about building a canal in Stavropol knew the realities of the Soviet System. However, he believed (as did most of the enlightened apparatchiki) that they had more than 6 years to transform the Soviet Union.
On Yeltsin's motives and creation, well... Let's say he lacks the historical perspective.
>Reality will show how "real" this mentality is. This why most russians still today consider all this countries "traitors" "butthurt belts" etc. So here also, Gorbachov not that far from averege russian. And well, USSR collapsed but it's system not. Existance of Putin, Nazarbaev, Lukashenko etc. show that basic idea stayed same and Yeltsin only get rid of ideology that after Gorbachov not served as good propoganda anymore.
I do think you underestimate Gorbachev, possibly due to how almost senile his political beliefs of today are. In regards to the relationship with the Warsaw Pact, I think that Gorbachev believed that given how supportive people in the Warsaw Pact were of his policies, this would mean that they'd elect reformers, even those that want independence because they wouldn't want to rock the boat and would prefer a slow approach to things. Gorby thought that he could trust the Germans into allowing for a slow and methodically letting go of East Germany.
Given how '89 was such a revolutionary year, it's obvious to see how wrong he was. But I think it's closer to Gorbachev believing that these nations would stick together in those trying times, as opposed to letting go of the collapsing Soviet bloc like it's an infected limb that needs amputation.
>Do you guys think that there was anything at all which couldve saved the Soviet Union by the end, or was it pretty much totally destined to fail in every timeline beginning in the 1980s or late 1970s?
Understandably, the closer the Soviet Union approached its peculiar end, the harder it became to reform it. From the '70s, it was becoming clearer that without a doing away of several key aspects of Soviet society, the system would continue bleeding from its inefficiencies. The most notable of these sectors was the agricultural one that was spiraling out of control into
a chaotic bloated mess that grew less efficient by the year.
The late Brezhnev years (especially '78-82) are the apotheosis of Soviet stagnation. Yet things would continue getting worse and worse, even as attempts to reform the system that were stifled by infighting and cronyism were being forced into place. For reference, in '89, only the most foolish of die hard loyalists genuinely thought the collapse could have been reverted by returning to the pre-Gorbachev course.
Why the Soviet Union collapsed is a very complicated question, one in which I must remind you that despite my pseudo-intellectual ramblings, I am woefully unprepared to answer.
I'll say this though, the system found it so difficult to reform itself based on things that were very much a design flaw, as opposed to an execution flaw. Alexander Yakovlev, the Canada guy I mentioned earlier, seems to have had an extremely insightful view of the events as they were happening, and was the most accurate of Gorby's advisors. He seemed certain that in '85, the regime had less than a decade of life at best. Which was a very impressive prediction, especially when compared to even what the US Department of State believed. The generally held consensus was that the Soviet Union would live on and that if Gorby pulls his reform program - great, but maybe he wont and things will go back to what they were. I'm not aware of any secretary of state who correctly predicted to the Soviet collapse in '85 let alone how it would play out.
Yakovlev posits that the only way the system could have been reformed in '85 was by a near-Stalinist threat to use Politburo purges to enforce the perestroika policy. Obviously, Gorbachev would have never done this - and neither would anyone rational open their first year as head apparatchik with a brutal purge Not after the Khrushchev thaw at least).
Perhaps if Brezhnev croaked far, far earlier [spoiler]Ideally not even coming to power
maybe the Soviet Union would still wave its flag over the Kremlin. It is worth pondering about that a SU that survived to the 21st century would have looked like. For all we know, they could have kept the same party structure and liberalized the economy like the Chinese did.
I suppose the Soviet Union could have bought itself a few more decades with hardliners going through with their putsch and holding every nationality in the SU at gunpoint, but I don't think that would be in the interest of anyone - What Russia would look like today after this would make the 90's look peaceful and optimistic.