>i also think that the wet market in wuhan was a superspreader, however i wouldn't be so sure that the virus originated there.
>[...] the wet market was [...] a superspreader
You use that word wrong.
>any infected human or infected pet animal (e.g. cats) who were in wuhan in december could have functioned as a superspreader (like that waitress in ischgl).
Could have, but apparently, did not, since most of the early cases were connected to the seafood market in question.
The person in Ischgl was a bartender. Compared to bartenders in ski ressorts, cats make very unlikely superspreaders. Cats usually don't have contact with hundreds of random strangers every day. Bartenders do. Bartenders yell into peoples faces all night long and touch glasses other people drink from seconds later. Cats don't.
>there wasn't mass testing in the usa before march
The spread of the disease is independent of testing. Your reasoning is along the lines of 'It only exists when I look at it'.
>the infection rate and covid-19 death rate is therefore simply unknown before broad testing began
You say there were somewhere between 10^0 and 10^1 cases in the US in November, right? Let's say this was on the 15th. Now, let's put together what we know to get a very simple model. The serial interval is about 5-7, so, for the sake of simplicity, we take 6. In a naive population, the reproduction number is somewhere around 2.4 and 3.3. But, for your benefit, we will put it at 2.4.
From 15th of November to 1st of March, there are 113 days. 113/6=18.8. 10^0*2.4^18.8 = 14 million. 10^1*2.4^18.8 = 140 million. So with a conservative estimate, there would have been at least millions infected in early March, which would have led to hundreds of thousands or even millions of cases of atypical pneumonia. And you believe this somehow happened, but went unnoticed?
>this is true for all countries, including germany (we started testing early and tested broadly though, which does play a role with regard to our death rate on paper in comparison to italy and spain although we do have a lot more icu capacity as well).
What to conclude from it?
>however burgers STILL test A LOT less than we do
Rate of testing does not affect rate of infections. Again, 'it only exists when I look at it, therefore, it won't have consequences when I don't look at it.'
>their population density is much lower than ours (usa: 33/km²; de: 232/km²) yet they have already more known cases (absolute numbers).
Spread might be slower in communities where the number of interpersonal contacts is much smaller. But for Americans, the number is obviously not 1/10th of the German number. For certain sections of the American population, it might even be higher. Compare an American college student to his German equivalent, for example. The typical German student would share a flat with 3 other students, with each of them having his own room. The American college student might share a room with a roommate, and a kitchen and a shower with 25 other students. I don't think that's common in Germany.
A trueism about sparsely populated areas is that they only contain a fraction of the population. Most Americans live in densely populated areas. Rural counties cover 97% of the American land area, but only 20% of the population lives there. Put differently, 80% of Americans live in 3% of the country. The corridor from Boston to Washington accounts for about 1/10th of American population.
Most Americans aren't potatoe farmers from Idaho who go shopping once a month.
>exponential growth curves begin flat and then explode
A middle-school definition of exponential growth demands a growth rate proportional to the function value in every point. It looks the same everywhere, and you can make it look like it "explodes" everywhere by choosing an adequate scale.
>this would correspond with a patient 0 in a remote rural area with low population density
To wrap it all up: you make up a story where
- a South-East-Asian bat-virus mutates and infects another host, likely a pangolin native to South-East-Asia
- it then infects patient 0 in a rural area of the USA, from where the virus does not spread, because the inhabitants of said rural area do not have much contact with outsiders. (Never mind how the virus got there.)
- then, in November, it randomly pops up in Wuhan, without spreading domestically first. (Maybe the Idaho potato farmer flew a crop duster to Wuhan for a holiday trip.)
And somehow, that's not mental gymnastics?
>to really find out all late 2019 flu related deaths who showed unusual symptoms need to be examined pretty much everywhere
With a naive population and a much higher lethality than all currently endemic flu strains, you'd go looking for unusually high mortality by flu or pneumonia, instead of looking at individual cases. Again, we can assume that those would have been noticed. Of course, someone who wanted to pretend that it's all propaganda to smear China would demand the impossible instead. Like a Russian proofster.
>a lot more data is needed to answer that question.
A localised, unusually high number of cases of atypical pneumonia would have been noticed in any other developed country, same as it has been noticed in China.
>i doubt though that politcians like trump or spahn are interested in actually finding out
It would hardly be Spahn or Trump who'd sift through the data, would it?
>given how ignorant they act all the time. it's enough for them to point fingers on someone else in order to distract from the fact that it took them 2 fucking months to do something other than uttering "pls, don't panic, it's just a flu in china"
Like I said in >>40307
, they took the wrong conclusions from near-misses with SARS and H1N1. Google for 'the boy who cried wolf'. From the point of view of politicians, the medical establishment who warned them was the boy who had cried wolf two times before. Same goes for huge shares of the German public. We have a metric fuckton of anti-vaccers who still see this as a scam of big-pharma to sell more vaccine.
>"we have everything under control" and "no need to use face masks". i purchased a pack of 25 face masks on amazon in february for 2€ per item, could sell 1 for + 40€ on ebay today.
Do you suggest everyone should have done that? Most people go out every day and would hence need 365 masks a year, at least. If everyone bought masks in February, there would have been too few of them all the same, and even fewer for those who need them most, i.e. those with compromised immune systems and medical staff. Buying masks in February would by no means have been a solution. Having more domestic production could have been part of the solution, but current demand would still outstrip prouction. Building a strategic reserve of supplies over years and serving all orders out of storage and running all production into storage would have been the correct thing to do. In Germany, this should have been started in about 2005. Instead, there was some friendly advice to municipalities to please stock up for emergencies. This advice was widely ignored.
>i don't have access to all the information politicians such as spahn have.
Most politicians aren't really decision-makers. They present a certain image and feeling to the public and try to stay popular. A minister like Spahn is only the temporary figure-head of a beurocracy. In Germany, the fail happened on every level of the hierarchy, with the lower levels of hierarchy starting to fail around the time when Jens Spahn won his first mandate in 2002.