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No. 56533
150 kB, 1080 × 723
To discuss ottoman industrial output, among other topics. Now with less soviet union posting maybe
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No. 56534
33 kB, 349 × 396
What are some examples of ideas, cults or personalities using these concepts, that managed to take complete political hold of a state/realm in relatively short periods of time? bonus points if it's pre-1789.
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No. 56543
>>56534
>using these concepts

What concepts? I don't quite fully understand your question, I fear.
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No. 56545
>>56543
Of course you don't, it was horribly phrased.
What are some examples of historical figures/groups that have successfully managed to use political, religious, etc concepts to justify an overthrow of the existing order and in doing so, placing themselves at the top of their new societal order.
The 20th century is full of these groups, as was indeed the 19th century, but what are examples of this happening prior to the French revolution? I suppose the American revolution would fit the bill, as would Anabaptist rebellions if they were successful. Coups that don't change the structure of their society don't count.

I guess a simpler phrasing would be what could be considered pre-1789 or 1776 revolutionary movements.
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No. 56546
>>56545
Isn't that basically the inception of Islam?
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No. 56550
>>56546
Indeed, the rise of Islam does fit into a revolutionary mould. Good point.
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No. 56868
277 kB, 850 × 1360
518 kB, 1440 × 1080
6 kB, 150 × 200
Good book, as the title implies it's more of a political biography than a real biography of the man behind the ideas. The book shows the evolution in Bukharin's thought and how it was successively influenced by the events of the Russian Revolution, NEP and collectivization.
Written in 1971, revised until 1980, the book does bear the marks of a book that was written before the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the odd amusing reference to "the present Soviet Union", to a somewhat hopeful belief that Bukharinism would make a return in the form of reform communism or downright rebirth under its proper, original name.

The author's sympathies towards Bukharin are open and understandable, Bukharinism as a humane alternative to Stalinism still holds up. That Trotsky somehow mutated into the good hearted heir of Lenin that would have maintained civil peace while Bukharin remains relatively unknown even in Left circles is an ironic legacy of Stalinism.

Not to delve too deeply into the theoretical questions and answers presented by Bukharin, it's hard to deny he was both a man of intellectual honesty and personal bravery - however peculiar his actions. One of the most 'western' of the Bolsheviks, Bukharin kept up to date with various developments in western social sciences, displaying an open and critical mind as opposed to the increased dogmatism presented by other Bolsheviks. Ultimately his cries for humane socialism, already a difficult position to hold within Russian marxism (Marxist science can't be held down by petty ethics), faced further opposition from the drumming of the heroic Octobrist tradition advertised by the 'super industrializers'. That the Bolsheviks can storm every fortress and fight on every front was an easier sell to up and coming party members than Bukharin's appeals to a calm and collected industrialization. Ultimately, a sense of loyalty and a shared belief in the historic role of the party doomed all of the Right Oppositionists. Determined to maintain a façade of party unity, they limited their attempts to use structures outside of the party to air grievances or mobilize for public support.

In his trial, the ending of which was already known to himself years before it took place, Bukharin spoke of his role in Bolshevism, of the Revolution and of the present path the country headed towards. In Aesopian language, he played not just the advocate of himself, but of the revolution. Understanding the great menace that nazi germany posed to the USSR, he advised unity around the party and the figure of Stalin. In his mind, Stalin was temporary and if anything only a minor setback in the great historical battlefield of class conflict and the natural 'growing into socialism'. As evidenced by his writing in the 30s, he understood that it was too late to turn back on collectivization and that the fate of the party rested on banding together, lest they all hang equally in an uprising - from the heroic super industrializers to the sensible advocates of the proletarian-peasant smychka.

For all his troubles, he was executed. There has been no rebirth of Bukharinism, the Soviet Union has fallen and concerned western leftists who loathe the excesses of Stalin's industrial plans rally around Trotsky.

Something that I'm not knowledgeable about is the existence of at least tacit approval of Bukharinism within reformist movements of Eastern bloc nations. The author mentions it as an embryonic development within the leadership of the USSR's satellite states but, as the extent of my knowledge on Marxism-Leninism political development finds a great abyss west of Lviv, I can't comment.
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No. 56905
>>56868
Sounds interesting, I don't know much about Bukharin (IIRC a Ukraininan poster once posted some of his prison poems here). Though recently I stumbled upon a rather obscure movie about him called Bukharin - Enemy of the People (1990/1). Haven't seen it yet but from what I've heard it seems to be a rather weird movie - a slightly surreal thriller.
There's a mildly interesting NYT article on its production: https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/13/arts/a-soviet-film-re-creates-history-but-it-makes-history-in-hollywood.html
Funnily enough, the same director also made Trotskiy (1993/4) a few years later. They're both on youtube, but unfortunately only in Russian without subs.

Btw, can you recommend some standard work or otherwise a book that's a good primer on the history of the Russian Revolution and/or Soviet Union? Preferably something that's somewhat entertaining and works as a casual read rather than something overly academic.
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No. 56912
187 kB, 882 × 1338
>>56905
Damn, I need to watch this one.
As a primer for the Russian Revolution, I'd recommend Sheila Fitzgerald's The Russian Revolution. It's a nice little book that spans from the background of the revolution to just before WWII. It's a relatively short book (200ish pages) whose basic premise is that the Russian revolution can be interpreted as an event that lasted from 1917 to the late 30s and it sets out explaining the different forces at play within this long revolution.
It's not overly in-depth and it's not a full history of the USSRbbut it's a solid work on this revolutionary period and my further reading on the topic has only confirmed Fitzpatrick's assessment. Would recommend. I think that with just this book and just very basic knowledge on soviet history beyond it, you can paint a relatively clear mental picture of the entire soviet history until about 1985.
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No. 56914
>>56545
There are lots of utopian or milleninarian groups throughout all of history and cultures.

Take the taborites during the hussite war for example.
They expected the apocalypse to occur soon and tried to establish the kingdom of christ on earth, an egalitarian society with no masters or servants where nobody had to pay taxes or do any hard labor. When the second coming didnt happen and their ressources ran dry they started to exploit the peasants as well as raid and plunder the sourrounding regions.
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No. 56923
>>56914
I really am hopeless ignorant on these central European happenings. I only have the vaguest ideas about the hussites, based on wikipedia speedrunning several years ago.
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No. 56976
>>56923
I gave a book about utopian movement from antiquity to the 20th century as a christmas present to my father.
It sounded quite interesting, next time I visit my parents I might get to read it.
Should be quite fitting to your thredas topic.

As you posted a picture of Hong Xiuquan above, I also thought of Zhang Xianzhong.
He was a leader of a bandit army who managed to gain control over Sichuan during the final years of the Ming Dynasty around 1644. He thought he was send from heavon to exterminate all sinful people, which he considered to be basically all people in the region. He carried out a campaign of mass killings that caused the area to be depopulated, the estimations vary but he killed from 30% to 80% of the population of Sichuan.
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No. 57001
25 kB, 331 × 499
Was reading in Stewart Brands II Cybernetic Frontiers (1974). Brand is the founder of the 'Whole Earth Catalog* a sort of print internet and important magazine for the US counter culture in the late 1960s. In the 70s he had used the money from the WEC to fund another magazine, the CoEvolution Quarterly concerned with issues of ecology that also include the mind. Quite interesting that mind and awareness and revolution intertwine here, this combination can be found today in political strategizing, theoretically and practically as well.
The first article had me think about the psychedelic boom, the psycho boom, the topics of mind and self exploding and the question in what way this counter cultural theme shaped certain theories and what role the mind has today, what would be the role of mind today? I don't know what is there besides the reductionist neuroscience stance and the opposite of non-reductionism, if that is even the case, light me up, CogSci Ernst. What to make of this difference is itself a question tackled by Bateson ironically.
Also the role of the mind, the relation of the mind to its environment. Idealism and materials come to my mind and this was a big fight among leftists at the end of the 1970s and perhaps earlier, about the strategies for revolution, changes structures and the change minds, or the other way around.
The book consists of two articles he wrote for other publications (Harpers and Rolling Stone), one on a sort of open systems theory of the world and mind, based on a visit to Gregory Bateson in Big Sur. The other is about technicians in 1970s computer labs, human-computer interfaces, and something else I forgot. Basically, the isolated, engineering, goal driven cybernetics in Brands own wording and the foreboding of the age of personal computers and communication networks. Now you know why the book is called two frontiers of cybernetics.
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No. 57052
>>57001
I still find it interesting to think about what would have happened to that field as a whole had other powers inherited the earth through say a Nazi/Axis power or Soviet victory. Off topic, but I ended up finding it spooky as a teenager why I kept getting AOL CDs in the mail after discovering the rampant conspiracy theorism on the internet, which I in turn only got to discover because of finally using one of those Illuminati looking AOL CDs to begin with. Perhaps it's tied to that I don't know, but now I routinely see people with different occult, Illuminati, or conspiracy theory tattoos. I have no idea why people get Masonic or Illuminati tattoos if they're not in them, but again I gurss I don't understand tattooist bydlo mindset. Likewise there's this one guy I sometimes see IRL who has crop circle tattoos, and one guy had a Ukrainian trident. It's funny when you become symbology literate but anyway I'd say this was a very important part to ultimately shaping the entire national culture, starting with those constantly mailed AOL CDs which led everybody to those bad geocities sites about muh Illuminati muh Masons muh UFOs mub deviltry. I somehow doubt we'd have gotten the same thing had the USSR become dominant, or what the internet will get shatted into during the Chinese century.
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No. 57309
https://www.newstatesman.com/international/places/2021/07/why-there-no-solution-our-age-crisis-without-china

A longer text (30min) from the historian Adam Tooze on China's history and why China shapes the 21st century. What I'd call social and political history, so not much culture in this one.
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No. 57327
1,6 MB, 3304 × 2210
What does Ernst think of this codex?
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No. 57341
45 kB, 704 × 512
>>57309
Read it a few days ago, solid stuff!

>>56912
Thanks for the recommendation btw, seeing as it's so short I'll try finishing it next week.
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No. 57342
>>57341
>Read it a few days ago, solid stuff!

I think what is most impressive is the evasion of shock therapy and the actual thriving and the lifting out of poverty of millions of people. The costs are tremendous but nobody should think the west was and is a cheap enterpise.
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No. 57343
291 kB, 835 × 1200
>>56533

https://youtu.be/gh6FMgv1oyY

Great film on the early history of Islam.
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No. 57344
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No. 57355
3,2 MB
>>57342
> evasion of shock therapy and the actual thriving and the lifting out of poverty of millions of people
Yeah, I had actually read the introduction of the recently released book he cites there - How China Escaped Shock Therapy by Isabella M. Weber - but it seemed a bit too specific for my current interests, for now I'm just happy knowing they managed to avoid the mistakes of the late Soviet regime in terms of economic liberalization

>>57343
Just looking it up - and apparently there's an English and an Arabic version with different actors that were made in parallel by the same director. Tbh I'm more tempted to watch the latter if I can find it in decent quality
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No. 57356
>>57355
That epub will make a fine addition to my collection.
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No. 57357
>>57355
>I had actually read the introduction of the recently released book he cites there - How China Escaped Shock Therapy by Isabella M. Weber - but it seemed a bit too specific for my current interests

I listened to a presentation of hers on the book, but fell asleep as so often when I do this. Usually, important books of those bigger university presses get talks where the argument is presented, or at least part of it.
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No. 57556
>>56912
Finished it today. Pretty good, definitely helped me fill in some gaps, especially about the period after the October Revolution & Civil War: the NEP, Stalin's rise to power & some rough idea about Trotsky's and Bukharin's roles/the internal party struggles.
But yeah for better & worse, it's very brief indeed. I also felt like the author's chauvinistic-liberal view shone through and rubbed me the wrong way at a few points - e.g. when she uses the metaphor of a "virus"/sickness for the revolution or glibly claims in the concluding chapter that Modern Russia is still "struggling to master capitalism and the free market". So without really knowing it better I suppose her interpretations of other events need to be read with that in mind.
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No. 57566
>>57556
You actually read it :DD Glad you liked it Ernst. As I understand it, the only point she brings across that is somewhat controversial is marking the revolutionary period as 1917-1938(? i don't remember if this end year is ever outright stated as the end of the revolution).

I don't know if this was the first work to put forward such a long "revolutionary period", but it's referenced in works by other authors as the reference for putting forward this long revolution theory. I remember originally finding the claim doubtful, that one could look at Stalin's collectivization as part of 1917, but since getting obsessed with this topic, I more and more see it as a very appropriate way of looking at things.

I think the writing style is that of a person who was pleased with putting forward a viewpoint that would tick off other academia nerds who defended the view of Stalin's rise as the begginings of Thermidor. The writing style is too provocative for such a limited and brief book, but alas :DD
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No. 57567
>>57566
It's pretty common in history to do that sort of thing, because actual neat time periods rarely represent anything meaningful. A particularly famous example being the Long Nineteenth Century, being 125 years long to accommodate the era and not just the tidy century.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_nineteenth_century
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No. 57573 Kontra
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>>57567
Yes, second it. Depending on the history written you really can get "weird" periods. But usually, these frame a certain phenomenon better than typical event history markers.

There is a book on Weimar Germany on marching, sports and democracy, cannot find it but the title contained 1917-1936 pretty much. Another example is Rethinking the Weimar Republic: Authority and Authoritarianism, 1916-1936 by Anthony McElligott
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/18854549-rethinking-the-weimar-republic
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No. 57601
>>57573
I keep meaning to read more about Weimar Republic. Thanks for the rec.

I also laughed at your picture. Speaking of social history, this one is really readable and interesting. YMMV on how you feel about drawing too many conclusions about historical individuals like it does (I'm not the biggest fan) but it's still a legit interesting read. I dunno what happened to my copy though.

https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300174472/ralph-tailors-summer

It's a product of its time. Microhistory was experimenting a bit with presenting history through more explicitly narrative/character lenses at this time. Maybe it still is, I'm not usually a microhistory guy.
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No. 57604
>>57573
> muh great man theory
Well, I think it's hard to deny that if Lenin or Hitler died from some accident before their period of political activity, history would go entirely different way. This is even more applied to times, when fate of kingdom depended on reproductive function of one single person. And it's not just personality of rulers, scientists, philosophers and religious prophets (though it's the most obvious case). Any random shit can drastically influence way of history through butterfly effect.

I know the reason why people oppose this so much. The don't like chaos and want to see a system. And explanation through interaction of different "-isms" provides it. In addition to that it looks scientifically and smart. If Hitler died in WW1, the same forces of "revanchism", "nationalism", "militarism" would still take their place, and WW2 would happen the same way as it happened.

Or maybe not. And no one would care about it besides some nerd publishing article about "Why nationalism in Germany didn't come to power". The problem is that "-isms" are great to explain history retroactively, but they lack any predictive power. Truly scientific approach is to honestly say "we don't know" instead of trying to rationalize consequences of random factors.
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No. 57605
>>57601
I'm not against actors. I've come from a university where people I handed in stuff where influenced by Foucault and such, but they kept the actors and did not succumb them fully under a discourse.
Microhistory is interesting, peeking into lives really, yet sometimes I wonder how representative they are, also I think it is hard to tell longer histories with a microhistoric approach, since structures can be missing. But I think these days many histories have a good mix under the banner of cultural history.

Concerning Weimar, I wrote a paper on the Reichsbanner, but also looked into cultural history and some historiography back then (2017/2018)

This one is a classic, albeit ofc criticized by now:
https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780809015566

This one guided my paper historiographically, It's reference 2 will give you other overviews on Weimar historiography, some of them are English language:

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/central-european-history/article/abs/bad-politics-and-good-culture-new-approaches-to-the-history-of-the-weimar-republic/28280213DF1B6CA445D3AF4A91A15399

>>57604
>history would go entirely different way.

Same could be said about "-isms" that have been forming before those people rose like Htiler and Stalin rose to their famous power positions.

>The don't like chaos and want to see a system.

Great man theory is literally one of the simplest systems. But ofc history is not an exact representation of everything that happened, just like social sciences today is not an exact copy of the life we live that it tries to describe and explain.

>when fate of kingdom depended on reproductive function of one single person.

the "fate" of the kingdom depended on many other things when you understand the kingdom as a system of governance/power, the "reproduction" of a kingdom is depended on peasants etc. Only from a certain viewpoint (that of great men) there is something like a "fate" I guess. Otherwise you would call it perhaps differently. But honestly, first we should know what you even try to explain and what is meant by fate.
What is at issue is the question of (historic) relevancy and explainability.

>great to explain history retroactively, but they lack any predictive power.

History is about explaining the past.
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No. 57607
>>57604
It's a dumb commie meme no one outside their ""intellectual"" circle takes seriously. Of course they don't believe individuals are important when they have no personality themselves.
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No. 57608
>>57604
To me it seems that it's fair to put more weight behind structures and events that form and condition human development within nations. Then again, pushed too far and it does deny the role of individuals in changing history. In the case in point, wholly probably that even if Lenin was assassinated pre-1917, a revolutionary period awaited Russia. Then again, it seems hard to deny that say the personal pathology of Stalin conditioned Soviet history.
I guess it's taken too far as a response to previous historiography who placed the entirety of casual relations to people who change history by their own will. After all, a Lenin or a Hitler born a few decades earlier would have been unknown.
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No. 57610 Kontra
>>57608
During my studies I had a seminar on event history and we had one example text from a German journal that published a text in 1917 (WW1) that based the whole of the Franco-Prussion War as an affaire d'honneur with Bismarck at its center. It was like reading a telenovela or novel. Actors in history are a valid catgegory to consider, but great men in power positions are not the only actors and their life alone does not make history, it plays it's part in history, but so do many others actors as well, actors and knowledge and practices, just to make a trias of important categories in contemporary historiography.
The discussion is not going very far asking the what if, because what if Hitler wasn't born, well what if the concept of nationalism never came into being? If any of those is missing we probably don't have a WW2 as it happened. History is about unraveling many threads, one might say.
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No. 57611
990 kB, 1330 × 1943
>>57610
Reminds me of a post-weimar movie on Bismarck's exploits :DD
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No. 57613 Kontra
>>57611
Is post-weimar a new tame way to say nazi?
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No. 57614 Kontra
>>57613
yes
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No. 57627
>>57610
It's even pretty reductionist to talk about Hitler as though somehow all the rest of the fascists weren't there or wouldn't have existed. Probably WWII still would have happened only it's more likely we'd have a figure such as Stalin pitting East vs West. Would an imperial Japan have been our ally then? Who knows. Likely those historians would have posited that Francoist Spain would lead the central powers to conquering Britain or some silly shit.

I'd agree, however the previous 5 years gave me real appreciation for how much one man in one position can fuck things up for everybody else given sufficient power or if there's a sufficient vacuum or power or competence.
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No. 57666
>>57605
Thanks for further infa. Notes taken. Dunno when I'll get there (currently on a late/post Pacific War bunnyhole) but I'm ready when I do get there now.
t. hanks

Only thing of note I ever did was preliminary exploratory work on industrial and logistical history surrounding the Enfield P.51 rifle. Was in early talks with a museum/old fort to go through a collection of 19th century arms that they'd recently acquired and work it into a cohesive exhibit but they were kind of flakey so it fell apart. Such cases.
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No. 57684
83 kB, 800 × 594
>>57666
Was Khalkhin Ghol really a turning point that made the Japanese turn southward onto European held colonies, or was it unlikely that they'd ever take the north approach? I've seen authors mention this as the last attempt that Japan did to face the Soviet Union and given the consequences, they turned back on the idea. Others don't seem to reference these border clashes or give them much relevance in Japan's expansion goals.
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No. 57697
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250 kB, 1298 × 998
>>57684
Don't want to make a definitive statement, but imo the Hokushin-ron (prioritising Manchuria and Siberian conquests) wasn't really going to happen one way or the other. While the demonstrated failure of the kantokuen did play a role in ensuring the ascendancy of the IJN as the predominant military branch (who favoured the Nanshin-ron that we came to know from the Pacific War), the Navy was also backed by a bunch of powerful Zaibatsu, so I think the weight was already behind the navy to take their plan to its conclusion rather than the Army. The latter plan also provided a greater variety of industrial resources that Japanese industry needed to recover following the depression, including some like rubber that couldn't really be gained from going north. I think that considering Japan's strategic goals of fueling a growing industrial sector through conquest, combined with large economic/political backing makes the Nanshin-ron more inevitable than the alternative.

That said, I'm an enthusiast and not a scholar so take that as an educated guess rather than gospel.
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No. 57701
109 kB, 665 × 1000
>>57697
Makes sense to me. Thanks for the reply, the inner workings of the Japanese imperial system are very mysterious.
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No. 57779
>>57701
>safety demands obedience
I can't even tell if that's satire. Was Australia always quite shit like that?
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No. 57915
18 kB, 400 × 277
>>57910
What are examples of revolutionary thought guiding Buddhist doctrine?
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No. 57917
28,1 MB, 379 pages
>>57915
The book is talking about Imperial China and not the PRC period.
I don't think Mao/the CPC gave enough of a fuck about Buddhism and Daoism to actually engage in a debate of doctrine with them, since from an ideological standpoint that'd require accepting the validity of an immaterial world, and that isn't something communists are too keen on I think. ("Knock it down like a blind man knocks down a glass" as the Hungarian saying goes. No fucks given.)

But there are historical parallels with how they cracked down on the monasteries and temples.
Buddhism itself historically was kind of a "revolutionary" ideology in China (not in the western sense that it sought to topple the existing regime), mainly because of how it came from abroad and how through its monasteries it was able to build up a separate power structure that had an intellectual class behind it with an ideology that competed with Confucianism.
It allowed for dissatisfied literati and peasants to "leave society" and become monks en-masse when Buddhism was introduced into China. It got so bad that it started to impact the economy. Which is why the Emperor Wuzong initiated a half a decade long campaign of extermination against Buddhists during the mid-9th century.
(And it's also why afterwards the state tightly regulated the amount of people who could become monks. It was both for ideological and economical reasons.)
So in this sense it was revolutionary, but otherwise until the 20th century I don't think there was a single "Revolutionary idea" in China in the western sense if you don't count religious uprisings like the Yellow Turbans (And any other Daoist Mysticist sect promising heaven on Earth/immortality in case of victory) or the Taiping Rebellion as "revolutionary movements".

The peasant revolts that weren't crushed locally and managed to topple a dynasty just restored the status-quo afterwards, since the Chinese tradition know no other way of ruling. But these revolts usually solved the economic side of the problems, which was that by the end of the dynasty, land ownership became too concentrated to support the population sufficiently, which lead to unrest.
This is why the first order of business under a new dynasty was land redistribution, which solved the crisis of the peasantry and also helped consolidate the ruling class.

The literati class did fuck-all during these "revolutionary periods" besides joining up with the different warlords in hopes of having joined the guy who will come out on top by the end and to help with the consolidation afterwards.
Gonna sound a bit Marxist but the literati aren't a "revolutionary class" in China. Neither are the monks. It's usually the raging peasants that achieved something historically. (But not politically.)

So we come to this uncomfortable conclusion Mao came to that to do anything in China "historically" (as in, to achieve historic-level change, like in the previous paragraph, not "according to history") you need a lot of angry peasants with pitchforks hanging officials.
And ultimately, you could interpret Mao's reliance on the peasantry and the goal of land redistribution as nothing more than a replaying of the same old record that happened before with the other dynasties.
(But with the twist that Mao utilised these tools to achieve political change instead of only achieving historic change, but even the political changes he achieved could be put in parallel with the founding of the Qin, wherein Qin Shihuangdi tried to replace Confucianism with Legalism, slashing and burning in the process, only for it to mellow out under the Han, creating a synthesis. So we can parallel the 1949-1997 period (Mao's ascendancy to Deng's death) to that of the transition between Qin and Han where a radical ideological and political change resulted in a synthesis that will influence China centuries to come.)

But I feel a bit uncomfortable with this analysis. It makes me suspicious because the pieces fall in place all too conveniently and the cycles are all to perfect, but I guess that's what you get when a country spends 4000 years of creating a tradition of writing history where the point is to have a narrative that makes sense from a philosophical/Weltanschauung standpoint.
China has this weird thing going on where even if something changes, nothing changes in a sense. Don't know why. Probably because traditional historiography in China was used as a tool to point towards the future. Basically everything had to be backed up by a historical reference or anecdote, even if it was something new. So the past, present and future all melt together into one weird eternity, which is very uncomfortable if you come from a culture with a completely differing historical and ideological tradition.
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No. 57922
703 kB, 768 × 576
>>57917
Well, revolutionary authorities shaping ecclesial denominations wouldn't be without precedent. It was the Soviet government that orchestrated the Lviv Synod as a means of placing the Ukrainian greek catholic church under Moscow's fold. It wouldn't surprise me if the CCP had issued similar edicts towards Buddhism. It's not contradictory, only dialectical XDDDD

Interesting stuff though, Buddhist schools and their hierarchies playing the role of an alternate choice society. I wonder how exactly different it would be for the peasant who makes the leap from being subject to temporal power to placing himself under religious authority.
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No. 57927
To what extent did Chernobyl hasten the Soviet Union's collapse? I can't help but think that somewhere between Gorbachev crash liberalisation and the Chernobyl disaster being the final nails in the coffin which made everybody want to do colour revolutions that the USSR would've made it at least to the dawn of the 21st century before imploding.
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No. 57928 Kontra
>>57922
>It wouldn't surprise me if the CCP had issued similar edicts towards Buddhism
I just don't know, because I haven't really read up on the topic, and I'm not going to make up shit on the spot to mislead you. I'd rather be honest and say I have no idea.

Buddhism for me has always been more of a hassle when it comes to dealing with Chinese culture, simply because I don't profess a great interest in its history or doctrines for whatever reason.
(It's probably that western "vulgar-buddhism" disgusts me to such an extreme level that I've developed an aversion to the whole thing in general.)
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No. 57930
51 kB, 640 × 360
>>57927
It was an event that played a significant role in both how the people saw the Soviet system and made it clear to the upper ranks that something had to be done. If Gorbachev had a set period of years to attempt to reform the system, Chernobyl shortened this window. At the same time, this incident made it clear to all the present degree of incompetence and bullshit self serving coverups was unsustainable. In some sense, it not only provided a rude awakening to Gorby & Co to the realities of the Soviet state but allowed them a freer hand in carrying out reform.
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No. 57941
43 kB, 517 × 404
>>57605
> Same could be said about "-isms" that have been forming before those people rose like Htiler and Stalin rose to their famous power positions.
Yes, but they could stay in history as "this is a theory which was discussed by gentlemen in Zurich in beginning of 20-th century, but never became dominant in any society".
However forming of ideology is even better example, good that you mentioned it. Would marxism still exist without Marx? Well, condition of workers in Marx' time were terrible and demand for social justice was high. And hegelian nonsense was in fashion among upper class of those time. Also it was not hard to notice that one can use capital to gain more capital. Don't know about formation theory before Marx though. However it seems doubtful that someone would still join all those things into a single teaching. Maybe, we would have something remotely similar. Maybe not. In any way, whole 20-th century history would be different. It should be noticed that most of commies tried to be orthodox Marxists, and those who didn't still were under great influence of his works.

> But honestly, first we should know what you even try to explain and what is meant by fate.
OK, for example. King dies early due to accident and leaves no any relevant heirs. Kingdom falls into war for throne, and neighboring faction uses the situation to occupy a large part of it. Invaders bring their culture and spread it on this territory (peacefully or by force).
As a result, for hundreds of years philosophers born on this territory have different mindset, artists follow different tradition, scientists go through different education system.
To sum up, a random event happened to one men leads to long-term consequences for whole society. This thing is so obvious that it feels strange to explain it.

> History is about explaining the past.
Maybe, but science is about predicting future. Because any bullshit pseudoscience can make up interpretation of events post-facto.

>>57607
It's funny how it doesn't prevent them from saying that Sovok collapsed because traitor Hruschov/Gorbachov/Yeltsin did something wrong. It seems like one Russian drunkard was stronger than "objective and scientific laws of history".
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No. 57944
>>57941
Science isn't an ideology but a methodology. I have no clue why so many idiots particularly redditors or Conservative Christian burgers attempt to make it into anything else. It is nothing more than the systemic testing of theories and knowledge to ascertain present facts, and thereby use it to extrapolate the future. Unless
>science fiction is attempt to predict the future
is what you meant. Scientific progress is what influences technological development and thereby makes the future, not predicts it. Theoreticians and inventors are however the ones that attempt to apply that scientific knowledge towards the technical progress which makes the future.
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No. 57946
>>57944
By "predicting future" I don't imply futurology. I imply predicting something like "if you throw object with speed X and angle Y where will it land?".
Science can answer such questions about future. It's related to falsifiability -- there are results of experiment which can possibly happen, and results which are definitely impossible according to scientific theory (they falsify it), so it gives us some information about results beforehand.
With pseudoscience you can explain everything. Astrology says, that object fall in Z meters because Neptune entered active phase. Dialectic materialism says that it happened because it's existence descended into non-being by denial. But that's not a force, it's a weakness. If those methodologies can explain everything, then you don't know anything beforehand. Whatever will happen, they will explain.
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No. 57952
15 kB, 780 × 235
Science is about modeling a system that fits the best with all the testifiable and verified data we may come up with. If we're to build a pervasive principle that comprehensively determines relationship between two objects then it's no longer a secret it has to be aplied in spite of the time (future or past) we're in.
Sadly enough, there are a lot of disciplines where people are unable to take out laws like that in contempt of massive endeavourments to make everyone look like physics. Yet, there's an ongoing need to epistemologically select out one model over the other so it would be more trustable and more reliable, so it would sound more reasonable. This one is "scientific" so it should be believed more. Politicians, regular people, sponsors know that. We all must have an authorative source so we would cut off time in making a preference by ourselves. It takes years to tell modern theoretical physics from physics of the 19th century that is deemed wrong as of now. So why would we not have something similar applied to different subjects of interest? People are as much, if not more, interested in reflecting on society, human beings, behaviours. Therefore they would like to have a tool to select out models that are not worthwhile.
>Science can answer such questions about future
Science cannot exactly answer about how a green ball falls down in a everest mountain and where would that be in a minute. It can answer where an abstract ball is at a starting point and if we're to apply an abstract force that we call gravity and many more where that would be. It turns out that classical mechanics model is fairly sure to tell where that visually perceived ball would be in a minute. But it's not absolutely sure. It may fluctuate and the ball would scaled off a 1cm and we typically tend to explain that by our imperfect ways of how we measure the starting points and the forces. But I see nothing wrong to apply the same principle to history, sociology, and etc.

We have bad history as it mosly fails to predict whether that regime falls in a decade or not, so as exact sciences like physics, we have bad ways of measuring the starting points. It's not that our laws of history are bad, or that there's no such things as undeterministic historical matter, it's that we have to master our tools to figure out what initial conditions for some event are.

But it is practical to range all the disclipnes in a spectrum where some models are likely to put out a deterministic law like a mathematical function, and those who are not.
Marxism has turnt out to be an insufficient apparatus to explain the events even of its presence. As a system, it fails in most of the regard for the fact that labor value theory is not accepted by many whereas it's the core principle marxism looms large out of. The thing that "marxism" is still valid is the fact that it's a frankestein made up by post-marxists that take out some features or a few of hypothesis out of these marxist models and insert them into another model, yet they may call it "marxsism".
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No. 57954 Kontra
>>57941
Marx and Marxism are not the same. Either way, playing the game of what if is stupid. You can go back further in history and replace individuals with different processes, events and structures, usually, they are intertwined.
A certain power structure, a belief system, a war, an invention. There would be no marxism without industrial revolution, what if Hegel would have never been taken seriously? There would be no Hegelianism, without it, Marx maybe would have never been taken into account. What of the situation of publishing would have been different, maybe capital would have never been published etc etc etc. You make up one thread in history over individuals to explain it, you can play the game and make up more.

Same goes for your king and the "fate of an empire", you make up a causal chain, as if this is what has to happen if a king dies. You could also say the king dies but there is no long internal fight among its potential followers, so there is no taking over of the empire by neighbors and everything that follows.
On the other hand, there is the crumbling of a belief system that makes god given power less and less legitimate. Which is not to be reduced to one person, merely an element.

The thing is I don't deny that events can have impacts, but it's not just big events that make up history. You just chose to write history that way.

This brings me to another point, you suggest some laws of history but you seem to overlook that history is bound to writing/narration. That is why this (methodology) is discussed by historians, but you know close to zero about it, yet are quick to judge that we need better methodologies, without being acquainted with what it means to write history.
Perhaps you imagine some mechanical history deeply determined history, funnily Marx and orthodox Marxists bought into mechanical thinking of history.
You basically want a model of the world to determine future history while the past is a foreign country, the past information are available only scattered and full of gaps. Given that models on world scale are only working for smaller areas of reality, your demand to is basically predicting the worlds trajectory. I wonder, if you could actually predict the future in that fashion wouldn't that change history in itself? Can a prediction of future history predict its impact in itself in the prediction it makes?
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No. 57955 Kontra
>>57954
Not him, but you've really crossed the line where you throw in a couple of ad hominems and present no arguments whatsoever to back up your claim "history is not made by big events".
> determine future history while the past is a foreign country
What if there's some model that works up the past to come up with conclusions that perfectly explain the future events? This is what he exactly expects from a science and you've mysteriously avoided to refute this model.

Imagine an inquery into Stalin and Hitler as a key figures and main factors in building up those regimes. Historians usually are not sufficed to leave it like that there because it typically binds them to a bad narrative and curios mind of a human being longs for something more. It's like handing out more questions than answers. So historians immerse themselves in a model how exactly their personas affect the regime. Their attrocious attitude to wipe out their rivals or anything like that. So. It brings imlicitly up a question whether that factor may be applied to something in the future. Would elimination of your rivals lead to a political success? Or would that leave you out with nothing but a set of crimes? History goes beyond the narrative of what happened it seek for the reasons behind that. Why? First, curiousity of a human being. Second, its epistimological status as a humanitarian science that puts histoy in a row with, for instance, economy or lingvistics. There are some tendencies to foreshaw what would be with a seller in a bazar if you taxed him to death or what words would have been obsolete by the time it will be the next decade. We can openly verify that because this is something that can be stated as true or false. You aim to deprive history of having something like that because history systematically fail to achieve that. Your approach reeks of sceptecism historians as the whole academia work to disclaim. Because it pushes history into a category where it cannot be trusted as much as an economy, for instance.
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No. 57959
>>57955
>present no arguments whatsoever to back up your claim "history is not made by big events".

I said events are one possibility and I did not deny that events have their place in historiography. I gave examples for why it is possible to write history from a different angle than just big events. Events will probably always be part of history and its writing as events are a category that is bound to time. But is one thing to say history is perfectly captured by big events or to say that big events have their share in capturing history.

>What if there's some model that works up the past to come up with conclusions that perfectly explain the future events? This is what he exactly expects from a science and you've mysteriously avoided to refute this model.

I'm interested then in how that model will recreate historical sources and materials of the past (inevitably gone thanks to time passing) that are not able to feed into the model as parameters first making it then possible to also determine a future.

>So. It brings imlicitly up a question whether that factor may be applied to something in the future. Would elimination of your rivals lead to a political success? Or would that leave you out with nothing but a set of crimes?

So, you want an ahistorical/transhistorical model for specific historical situations? Well that is what Marx and others in the past tried as well, they wanted laws of history. Current history/historiography abandoned that.
The parameters might have changed and there are many many many parameters to consider in history, as history can pretty much encapsulate everything from social life, symbol use to geological formations, natural events like droughts and technological inventions and its concrete use that might be different from what inventors imagined, if they even did that in the first place, to political decisions and family life.
Ofc some outcomes are likely. You kill your political opponent and the power position you seek to possess gets in close reach. But it could very well backfire quickly. But how to tell that? It really could depend on events first deemed minuscule (in the historic present for example), but later turn out as significant for the development (that is when historic research is done and this factor "overlooked" by contemporaries is pronounced as important for the development by historians, who from a very different angle in time have another perspective on the time around the political killing and can thus consider very different things in their explanation than contemporaries).
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No. 57961 Kontra
Also, I want to know how models account for narration that seems to be an important category in human beans and their social life.
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No. 57963
>>57959
>history is perfectly captured by big events
As I understood, he claims the historical chain of events is crafted randomly by factors that are hardly or not at all catchable, which makes history as a narrative of deterministic string of events irrelevant. You may talk about how revanchist the environment was to paste adolf together but what if he was killed at a night street corner and boom, no nazisto. He is onto that and also claims that it's not science as it has no predictive power.
>a category that is bound to time
I view and read most of the history as determenistic, as a quest for these linked objects. It happened thus because this and that. I may be biased, but I've yet to see any major history work that is not trying to go beyond reasoning everything is random while explaining. That presents no informational value. It's like saying everything's everything because it's like that and that's the way it is. No need to go further than that. That's why this deterministic notion becomes axiomatic in the historical sciences. Typically, historians try to catch it depending on what tradition they are in: nominal or real. The former, more emprical approach sees historical acts as a mere consequense of a person's deeds which looks like more what you have suggested. His autonomous will leads to that, what persona's qualities have lead us to that? The latter is more abstract approach. It creates such entites as "the left" or "the right", for instance, "the environment" and endows them with subjectivity, the ability to act, in the historical relationships. It's not John Lennon who commited this historical act and prove being hippy is cool, it's the collective left that did it. Ofc, there's a mix of both approches that results in a different academy or tradition. But they are all built up on a notion that some events are deterministic. Otherwise history is nullified to a novel and should be thrown out of the "science" club. Moreover, each science in fact holds this notion as an starting axioma. That there's deterministic objects that we may grab up and make it a law. Otherwise it's not science.
>will recreate historical sources and materials of the past
It does not need to. There are a lot of holes of recreating some version of history that are filled with assumptions and beliefs. It does not disprove the fact that there could be such a model. It explains the past but also explains the future by way of seeking out patterns in the past that can be applied in the future. Every school essay on the neccesity of history mentions how "we have to be taught from our lessons in the past". In fact, 95% of people see history as a tool to prevent the present and the future from atrocious activities of the past. It's like a standard answer.
>ahistorical/transhistorical model for specific historical situations
So your entire point is based upon the assumption that ability to tell the future by way of invistigating the past is something that does not belong to history? That it's ahistorical? That it's transhistory whatever that means? I may be dissapointing you, but this is not the motto history is written with. It's not marxistic to think that you may figure out patterns of the past to employ them in the future. In fact this is what called learning and adapting and it's the thing that each one of us have followed since her birthday. It's natural for people as we're built this way to regard history in the same way. It's natural because it's curious.
>they wanted laws of history.
You're misunderstanding marx. They wanted the universal law of the whole history, not some of them, as they were hegel-inspired that offered the univeral law of the whole existance.
You do not need to be marx to learn lessons from history which implicitly confirms that deterministic chain of events that can be repeated in the future if we push the exact same buttons. It's the motto history have been developing with for the whole entirity of modern-day historiography. The only things that change are approaches to retrieve those patterns out of the pool of events.
>history can pretty much encapsulate everything
Ofc it can, but a great deal of statements are discared so that there are only the ones remaining that are to be checked whether they are true or not. And if we try to explain it with statements that are imposibble to be classified as true or false, then we would be anti-scientific, or given the subject of discipline, a-historical.
> But how to tell that?
By investigating what happened next.
>"overlooked" by contemporaries is pronounced as important for the development by historians
Overlooking and finding out something new is a good sign of developing. You cannot reach the pinnacle of a mountain by one step and while you're going up you're still at some height. Historians, in this regard, have to only agree as the whole what direction they are heading to.
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No. 57964 Kontra
15 kB, 240 × 320
>>57961
You're possessed by the thought that history is narration.
Let's go beyond that indoctrination and state that mathemtical analytical expressions are in fact a narrative.
What? They present no mathematical object like adding up two entites together or whatever that shit is? It's written, therefore it's a narrative. So mathematics is narrated. They have the properties of a narrative.
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No. 57965
78 kB, 960 × 926
247 kB, 1200 × 1151
>>57964
Your runglish is confusing me a bit. Do you equate writing with narration? It's not the same. Narration is a form of presentation and making sense. Writing is not necessarily making sense. 4+6 is a mathematical operation not a narrative.
Also, be careful with your vocabulary. The past is not narration, narration is part of historiography. Past is presented in narrative form and is called history (etymologically story, storia etc, in German it is used for fiction and non-fiction academic subject).

>>57963
>>57963
>As I understood, he claims the historical chain of events is crafted randomly by factors that are hardly or not at all catchable, which makes history as a narrative of deterministic string of events irrelevant. You may talk about how revanchist the environment was to paste adolf together but what if he was killed at a night street corner and boom, no nazisto. He is onto that and also claims that it's not science as it has no predictive power.

Who is he? Also, I don't understand in what way your paragraph relates to the sentence you took the quote from.

>But they are all built up on a notion that some events are deterministic

I never said btw that the past is random but that factors for causal chains are numerous which makes it questionable that one big history of known persons (kings, politicians) is the way to make sense of the past and explain the past. Also, I'm not sure if you can easily equate the notion(s) of causality with strict historical determinism.

> Every school essay on the neccesity of history mentions how "we have to be taught from our lessons in the past". In fact, 95% of people see history as a tool to prevent the present and the future from atrocious activities of the past. It's like a standard answer.

But it is not about predicting the future, but learning about past "mistakes" in order to not repeat them, which is something different. I engage in history quite a lot. Ofc, I can see patterns and rhetorics I learned about in history emerging again and again and people falling for it, thinking this is something new. My advicer once said to me "at least we know that it has been there before". Or "knowing (the) literature protects from discovering novelites". Yet seeing patterns does not mean it will occur exactly the same. Take Weimar Germany, people used it as a picture when the AFD got to rise as new party in the last years here. But it is problematic to think Weimar Germany will repeat itself with the rise of this party, so many factors that go into the past happening are not the same anymore, which makes it likely that history will not repeat itself. It's phrase. Ofc fascism can come back, it never really went away. But that will very likely not be a copy of the past, certain acts will reoccur, but whole societal context has changed since then.

>So your entire point is based upon the assumption that ability to tell the future by way of invistigating the past is something that does not belong to history? That it's ahistorical? That it's transhistory whatever that means?

You see, why I'm sometimes confused about your reactions is that you don't seem to understand what I'm talking about. I never said that history and its tasks are ahistorical or transhistorical google would have help you. I said the model you guys demand is one that works transhistorical or ahistorical.

> I may be dissapointing you, but this is not the motto history is written with.

I've probably read more books concerned with history than you. Learning from the past by understanding what happened ok, but predicting the future no, that is no concern of history books. Perhaps books reflect on the present, as the writing of history takes place there, but close to zero academic books are concerned primarily with predicting the future by presenting a history. You just use some bio-cognitive research results to make up a norm that history should follow.

> learn lessons from history which implicitly confirms that deterministic chain of events that can be repeated in the future if we push the exact same buttons. It's the motto history have been developing with for the whole entirity of modern-day historiography.

I call it bullshit, please show me that historiographic literature that you claim is prevalent for at least 100 years. History as an academic subject is about 200 years old btw.

>The only things that change are approaches to retrieve those patterns out of the pool of events.

So reality is just patterns that never change? I say relations make up patterns and those change which makes it difficult to build a good model. That is why I think your model demand is shitty, it assumes that there are patterns that never change throughout history, you don't even consider that relations between patterns can change. That is why I called your demand for a model like that ahistorical and transhistorical. The model is only as good as it is built and yours is built badly. The model itself cannot account for its place in history as well I suppose.

>Ofc it can, but a great deal of statements are discared so that there are only the ones remaining that are to be checked whether they are true or not. And if we try to explain it with statements that are imposibble to be classified as true or false

Good luck, you will run quite quickly into problems if something is true or false from the past, since you are dependent on historic sources. Before your model can begin to work you have the work of the historian, lel. And even then what is a factor that can be neglected and what not? How can a model know this? And besides, natural/envornmental events, decisions and inventions can all be true, you still have to connect them and make sense.

You know, your strict analytical philosophy of science approach to history is funny, but has been discarded in modern day history.

Makes me think of internalism vs. externalism debates, and history deems itself external, history has its own historicity and that is common sense in modern day historiography not your wishful thinking.
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No. 57966 Kontra
>>57963
Here, some modern day historiography

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/past-is-a-foreign-country-revisited/B6FA38F2EB08FB3E35183EE6DEBB81F4

https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/metahistory

I also tell you what I think is "natural" not just learning and curiosity but also man relating to the past, to that what as has been, which was before. The past is used and instrumentalized. History is concerned with that as well.
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No. 57968
4 kB, 404 × 245
>>57965
>>57965
>writing with narration
A spoken or written account of connected events.
I see a set of connected events in the picrel where there's some dx who becomes x in the end. It's also a written account. These two properties are neccessary and sufficient according to the definition by google.translate.ru (sorry, on the other hand I use my own ISP's dns server, not the google one).
>Narration is a form of presentation and making sense
It's not sufficient to define it like that. It may embrace a great deal of other objects that are deemed not narrative or relating to narration like a song or a rhyme. It's also a form of presentation and making sense. So for my taste, mathematical expression in the pic on the right are as narrative as history.
>Who is he?
The other russia. The dark side of the moon.
>for causal chains are numerous which makes it questionable that one big history of known persons
This does not disprove my claim that there could be patterns in the past that people use in the future which does imply there's some things determened in a chain of events.
>I am not so sure
>equate the notion(s) of causality with strict historical determinism.
This, yet again, does not disprove any of what I have said. It merely shows your lack of statements that can be considered as beliefs or knowledge. Only hypothesis. Also, you're putting words in my month. I am not adherent of something strict. In fact, I talk about the notion of causality as something determenistic. It's thus just by mere definition. In fact, that's two side of one coin. If one event all the time causes another. If we say this caused that, that will be determened. Simple as that. If we say all the things are determened no matter what, it'd be a nonsense statement as it does not tell something new because we can't check that one event is determened and the other is not if everything's determened so we essentially fail to define what is determened and distinguish that phenomenon to talk about it as a separate entity. So by saying determinism I don't mean "strictness" of each and any event, I imply there's some events that are determened.
>But it is not about predicting the future, but learning about past "mistakes" in order to not repeat them
>, which is something different
I failed to follow the argumentation line, so correct me if I got it wrong. You cannot replicate Weimar Germany with the party revival as some people think, because a lot of things as of now are not the same as in the past and you think you're drawing this conclusion from the past. How many logical steps will it take for you to realise that your statement on the absence of new germany is a prediction of the future that is drawn from the investigation of the past, of the history of germany that you compared with today's germoney?
>I said the model you guys demand is one that works transhistorical or ahistorical.
But the model i said is exactly where one can draw some conclusions from the past because there's some things determened.
>I've probably read more books concerned with history than you.
It's another ad homenem in one post. Dude, stop. It's an imageboard. That shit was created primarly for ad hominem to not work.
>predicting the future no
>that is no concern of history books.
No arguments for this point. Just a doctrine nobody touches because that would make you read less books or whatever.
>are concerned primarily with predicting the future by presenting a history
I think that you confuse the whole picture of drawing a future with things like predicting that bombing religion sites would lead to extremist reaction by those religion adherents. This we can tell by taking a glance in the past where america bombed the middle east. History is not about predicting the future because its subject comprises events of the past. That is virtually its definition. I say that by reflecting and highlighting some events, by inferring from some events, by telling that X caused Y in the past, we can tell things and make statements about the future where X yet again shows up. If we strip history of future, we will basically tell that X caused Y is bullshit and there's no hisory like that. This would make it anti-scientific. That's the whole point of mine.
>please show me that historiographic literature that you claim is prevalent for at least 100 years
https://www.amazon.com/Apologie-Pour-Lhistoire-Metier-Dhistorien/dp/2200321759/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=Apologie+pour+l%27histoire+ou+M%C3%A9tier+d%27historien&qid=1628599655&s=books&sr=1-2
> reality is just patterns that never change
That's a philosophical issue I am not ready to discuss.
>are patterns that never change throughout history,
Because X causes Y is never changed by definition. If there's X, it will cause Y, no matter what when and how. This is fixed in the definition.
> if something is true or false from the past, since you are dependent on historic sources
There's the whole tradition of positivism in the history. You have to hear of them as being relevant.
>s. Before your model can begin to work you have the work of the historian, lel
Dude. You can't win an argument by ad hominem.
> but has been discarded in modern day history
There's a lot of schools and universities and academies that study history from their own perspectives. That mere fact that you deny that it's presented does not deprive them of academical creditablity.

Also, your 4chan-like pic of that feel guy triggers my autism. Please stop posting that.
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No. 57972
14 kB, 460 × 273
>>57968
>one reference
>it's Bloch from the late 40s
I'm cool with a single reference provided it's both up to date and on-topic but shit son, that's both a book from the perspective of the Annales School, not on historiography in general, and is fucking ancient for this kind of discussion. For context, historiographical works from the late 90s are laughably out of date. It does make everything you say make more sense once I know what you're trying to say, but the Annales School doesn't constitute the entirety of history, and by its very nature, cannot constitute the entirety of history because it is centered on the analysis of large sections of time and the processes involved. Traditional/orthodox Annales history is both very distant as an author and studies long durations of time from that distant perspective. It is a useful tool, but as incomplete as any other.

The book I posted here >>57601 is fundamentally impossible to write using the orthodox Annales methodology because it runs counter to the longue durée which is one of the most central parts of the school, and it asks questions and poses some proposed answers to personal questions. Just a convenient example.

However, even if the Annales was the answer to Historiography, it's had a shitload of development since Bloch, hell the Annales was developed into the French 'New History' which modernised the old methods especially in the region of 'great men' funnily enough and has largely replaced the traditional Annales outside of a few holdouts.

>Dude. You can't win an argument by ad hominem.
That's not an ad hominem, lel.
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No. 57977
>>57968
I will answer your question at a later point as I need to focus on something else.

But ofc I cannot sit still as my autism is triggered as well.

>>57972 started to go on Bloch and I will follow here as I made a quick research I partly read Bloch Les rois thaumaturges: Étude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale particulièrement en France et en Angleterre

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Bloch#Major_works

>He believed that history was the "science of movement",[188] but did not accept, for example, the aphorism that one could protect against the future by studying the past.[130]

[130] is the scholar Daniel Chirot who wrote on Bloch.

I'll also translate to you what the German wikipedia says about the last chapter in the book you posted:
>In the last and not complete chapter, Bloch deals with man's categorizing thinking, also a fruit of our "rational" nature. Causal relationships seem to be man's favorite, but not everything can be embedded in such a cause-effect web, and far too often the questions of why are lost. Causes in history are not only motives, but also external changes that can shape a society, as in the example of the gulfe mentioned at the beginning. Consequently, no generally valid causal relationships can be established, since people do not always react in the same way to the same things.
>Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

To make sense of the gulf I quote/translate the summery of the first chapter made in the German wikipedia
>In the beginning was the word. This is how Bloch begins his first chapter. The word history or historia, he says, is a word that has constantly changed its meaning over the two thousand years of its existence, yet still means the same thing. In the remainder of the chapter, Bloch discusses the different types of history, noting that there is, for example, a history of volcanic eruptions, which, while of supreme value to geophysicists, has nothing to do with the profession of historian. However, there are overlaps where one field of research can complement another. To this end, he brings the example of a gulf that reached deep into the coast of Flanders in the 10th century, but later silted up and shaped the history of geology there, but also of the people. And there it also becomes an interesting development for the historian. Such examples will be used to show how different disciplines are ultimately dependent on each other. Bloch thus sets up a vague definition of history: "History is the science of people".

>>57968
>This does not disprove my claim that there could be patterns in the past that people use in the future which does imply there's some things determened in a chain of events.

But how far reaching? Ofc patterns will repeat, people will produce food in the near future for instance, but their relation to other things/patterns is likely different and thus the whole causal chain can be different. Also there is the question of how many causes and subsequent chains are sufficient.

>I failed to follow the argumentation line, so correct me if I got it wrong. You cannot replicate Weimar Germany with the party revival as some people think, because a lot of things as of now are not the same as in the past and you think you're drawing this conclusion from the past.

First of all, learning from history and not making mistakes again that happened in the past is a normative enterprise and not an actual fact that happens. You should learn from history and maybe can learn from history, but it does not has to happen.
When I say the rise of the party won't replicate Weimar Germany, I make a prediction on what is very unlikely to happen again in that form. I cannot make a positive prediction though. And even if I take history into account here, that is not the task of history as you said, it is contemporaries (you/me/them) that use history. The daily bread and butter of work done in the field of history though does not revolve around this kind of prediction, which is not really a prediction in my eyes, as I cannot claim what will happen, only claim that the repetition of Weimar Germany is unlikely to happen as many other factors that determine this are different and thus the outcome will be different.

>It's another ad homenem in one post.

Not really, it's a statement that implies I have an idea of contemporary historiography as I have read many journal articles and books in the field of history in the last 5 years, when I studied.

>No arguments for this point. Just a doctrine

True. It's a claim. Coming back to what I wrote above I can say from my experience of reading perhaps 150+ articles, introductions and books in the field of history that this is rarely, if at all, a concern of contemporary historiography or works of historical inquiry, it does turn up but know as you think it does. You are right in that I don't know the whole field, for example I know there are historians that use sociobiology to argue on history, but these are on the margins. I'm pretty sure that my former uni, which had "famous" historians (that is: known in international academic circles), taught me pieces of the current canon and an idea of historiography quite well.

>I say that by reflecting and highlighting some events, by inferring from some events, by telling that X caused Y in the past, we can tell things and make statements about the future where X yet again shows up

While I understand your example of the Middle East and would even agree that it is a causal explanation that I would not outright deny. But I'd say that this causal relation is not the only one to properly explain religious extremism in the Middle East. It depends on many more factors that make up the Middle East which makes it so hard to predict future from past in a precise way. I know that Big Data and preemptive action is based on this thinking. Another topic that will lead to further questions of epistemology.

The question of the model for history I wanted to address at a later point might be handled now then regardless. Such models of past behavior and predicting exist, but their scalability and validity is questionable. And are not the object of historians, perhaps more like governments, cooperations, Big Data, psychology and the likes.
>>
No. 57984
> leave response in discussion at morning
> return from wörk and see 10 essays after it
fuggg I lost it :---DDDD
>>
No. 57985
>>57954
> You could also say the king dies but there is no long internal fight among its potential followers, so there is no taking over of the empire by neighbors and everything that follows.
Yes, this is also possible. And? The situation is that you have two options:
  1. Admit that the first case (internal fight and all the following happens) is probable. Then you'll have to admit that personalities and even casual events with them can drastically influence history. Personalities matter, Q.E.D.
  2. Say that first case is impossible and second case (no internal fight) is inevitable, but this will be obviously absurd claim.
>>
No. 57986 Kontra
>>57985
>Personalities matter, Q.E.D.

Never said that actors don't matter, but the relations of the actors matter as well. That is why a history written about "movers and shakers" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movers_and_Shakers) that make them the epicenter of history is insufficient.
>>
No. 58021
97 kB, 337 × 500
This was an incredibly pointless book to read, because the subject itself (Austria-Hungary-China relations) was such an irrelevant and poorly documented topic.
I genuinely felt embarrassed by how retarded the Dual Monarchy was as it desperately tried to assert itself as a great power in Asia without actually investing anything into it.
Basically the entire thing was just to keep up appearances.

Even the fucking Boxer-Rebellion was a shitshow. A-H sent 400 troops. Most of them sailors. Three warships.
Casualties: 11
In combat: 5
From Typhus: 6
Total cost: ~30 Million Crowns
Reparations received: 9 Million Crowns (~0.81% of all reparations awarded to the 8 Nation Alliance)
(Even if we count interest, until 1917 China only paid back 19 Million, so in the end it was a pointless, expensive digression that brought no benefit to anyone and the Monarchy only went into it because it wanted to look like one of the big boys.)

Also because it's a book from the 60s it had this really retarded token Marxist analysis shoehorned into it at parts where they tried to paint the Boxers as some sort of ideological precursors to the CPC because of how "both were Anti-imperialist forces" or something like that.
Yeah I guess you could paint them as members of a political tradition but to say that this anti-imperialism implies any sort of ideological continuity is again retarded.
(Same goes for the utterly boring and dry focus on how the Socdems reacted to the whole Anti-Boxer coaliton and war in the Far-east. It's in the book for ideological reasons probably.)

I'm trying to find books on Hungary-China relations from a cultural standpoint but I just can't seem to come across anything for some reason. I have the document collection of the Party Archives dealing with China 1949-1989 and a coffee-table book that has "documents of Sino-Hungarian friendship from the 90s" but nothing that deals with how we interacted culturally. (Which is strange, because for Japan, there's multiple books like that.)
>>
No. 58024
>>58021
Well, at least your country was invited to take part in putting down the boxer rebellion.
>>
No. 58027 Kontra
>>58024
Unironically, I'd rather forget that I ever gained access to this information.
The Navy did nothing. The detachments only saw action near Beijing (mostly just scouting because it was like 70 people) and then the only action the detachments took was looting and burning two villages and then executing ~25 Chinese at random for "being boxers".
This is genuinely embarrassing. It's pathetic.

The result? A half a square kilometre large concession in Tianjin with a shit coastline that the country had no capital to develop and millions in building costs and extra upkeep on top of the Beijing consulate it already had.
(So it's like 35 Million crowns total because of having to build living quarters in Tianjin, having to actually BUY the concession, having to electrify it, having to build a tram service and so on.)
My head hurts it's so petty and cargo-cultish.
I mean I get it. If the Dual Monarchy wanted to be a Great Power then it had to act like one, so it was a necessary evil, but it's so lacking in every aspect I can't help but shake my head, wanting to run away
>>
No. 58031
4,7 MB, 3118 × 4267
>>58024
I've read a popular book (by orientalist professor though) about China. If it's true, then I feel mix of pity and hate towards Chinese.
Now I want to read more about opium wars and cultural revolution. I've heard some cool stories about how Chinese generals lost 50k soldiers against 5k Brits, then reported to emperor how they heroically killed million Brits and lost only 50k soldiers. Or how they were afraid to fight the enemy so instead they fought their own peasants and declared them traitors. Also it's satisfying to see how someone so incredibly smug were put on their place.
And cultural revolution is even more insane than that.
>>
No. 58079
>>58031
In my opinion it is now time for westerners to be put into their place.
>>
No. 58080
30 kB, 200 × 300
>>58031
Forgive me for mentioning films in a history threada.

To live (Huo zhe) 1994 is my favourite chinese film and portrays the entire mao era from a common familys perspective including "denounciations of class enemies" and such in the background of everyday life.

I really enjoyed The Red Detachment of Women 1961 too. It's an early propaganda film from the cultural revolution.
>>
No. 58084
>>57944
>I have no clue why so many idiots particularly redditors or Conservative Christian burgers attempt to make it into anything else

I honestly blame IFLS much more than Reddit for propagating this type of thinking:
http://www.thebestpageintheuniverse.net/c.cgi?u=youre_not_a_nerd

Yes, I know Maddox is now a persona non grata, but goddamn, he really fucking nailed it with this article.
>People love science in the same way they love classical music or art. Science and "geeky" subjects are perceived as being hip, cool and intellectual. So people take a passing interest just long enough to glom onto these labels and call themselves "geeks" or "nerds" every chance they get. I feel a sharp pang in my head every time some moron on Twitter or Facebook says something like "i'm doing my homework i'm such a nerd LOL!!!" Wrong, fuck belch. You're not a nerd for doing your assigned homework; you're doing it because you have to, not because you want to. That'd be like saying, "I'm eating food, I'm such a foodie, LOL!!!" Since when did it become cool to label yourself a "nerd" anyway? It's an artificial counter-culture construct exploited by stupid websites
> If you think geeks are so sexy or cool, bang one. Go to any university and find a computer or physics lab at 2AM and take your pick. Until then, go commit cultural fraud someplace else, and take your phony "I fucking love science" group with you.
>>
No. 58103
612 kB, 560 × 600
>>58079
I don't think so.

  1. Westerners are not chauvinistic. You can be foreigner and still be treated like equal. Sometimes even reach very high position in society, take Satya Nadella for example. In China you will always be second class human just because of wrong race. So, unless you are Chinese expat, there is no much sense in simping for them.
  2. Westerners are not smug. Such impression only occurs because their achievements speak for them.
I think, it's exactly the opposite. They don't value their best traits, praise "noble savages" and mysticism too much and are very busy with self-loathing about what their ancestors did. But events like conquest of America happened not because Westerners were especially ebil (everyone was like that in past), but simply because they were stronger.
Totally opposite case of "muh 5000 years of history" and "muh northern barbarians".

3. Western society is more free and humane.
I expect very hardcore mental gymnastics in attempts to refute this one. Something like
> Merkel says "vote for me or bad things will happen"? Literally terrorist!
> Someone is thrown to jail for speaking bad of Xi? And you call that censorship? Arhchchuallly let's define what censorship is...
>>
No. 58104
262 kB, 750 × 978
>>58080
Thanks for advice, will watch it someday. I watched picrelated by the way, a long time ago. Don't remember much, but can recommend.
>>
No. 58106 Kontra
>>58103
>Westerners are not chauvinistic. You can be foreigner and still be treated like equal
A lot of asterisks required on this one, the most progressive of Europeans can be very chauvinistic - even if it is played out differently than other forms of shitting on foreigners. I think in some sense, myths of the noble savage have their roots in an European sense of superiority and some sort of colonial paternalism.
In more extreme forms, it's very much a believing that other people are pure and innocent in the same manner that children are. If they act poorly, it's not their fault - they just don't know any better.
>>
No. 58108
>>58106
>have their roots in an European sense of superiority and some sort of colonial paternalism.

Yeah. Generally, the enlightenment brought to us a civilizational pedagogy that sets out to educate each and everyone according to certain ideals. This also includes the "children" (non europeans) and hints to why you can call it paternalism. And against this sort of rational parental government, the noble savage was born among others things, though this might be a bit too short. Are Europeans smug? They at least thought highly of themselves, except the troublemakers that attack the ideals.
>>
No. 58109 Kontra
>>58108
Also while Europeans set out to treat everybody equally (an ideal) there is a blatant gap when you look at the history of what happened.
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No. 58111
80 kB, 750 × 578
>>58109
I think the only people who Europeans (in narrow meaning of this word) are smug about are Americans. And this is regardless of political views -- far left, far right, sometimes even moderates, everyone is like that.
I guess the reason is wounded national pride. You know, you were the bad guys in WW2. And then you were defeated by USA as part of the good guys coalition. Then USA helped you to rebuild and saved you from socialism. And now you are USA's smaller brother in alliance.
>>
No. 58112 Kontra
>>58111
>I guess the reason is wounded national pride.

This is a pan-European phenomenon and when I look at imageboards/internet, probably all people make fun of America, as it is the world power that shapes the world.
And people like me don't have any national pride. I can make fun of being born in Germany and I sometimes think it's funny that we have specific rituals here, but that is not national pride.
>>
No. 58113
>>58111
It isn't about WW2, the same is the case for European countries that were both allied and enemies of the US in the second world war. It predates 1939 too, something about the US rising as its own industrial, highly advanced power clashing with the image of new world bydlo savages without European high culture(tm).
>>
No. 58116 Kontra
>>58113
Ah yes, Americanization horrors, I totally forgot that. Came across it when I read about Weimar Germany.

>Since the beginning of the twentieth century, European observers and commentators have frequently employed the term 'Americanization' to make sense of the astonishing rise of the USA to the status of a world power. More specifically, they used this term to describe the social changes brought about by industrialization and urbanization. In this context, European intellectuals have often used 'America' as shorthand for 'modernity'; across the Atlantic, they believed, it was possible to learn and see the future of their own societies. Criticism of 'the Americanization of Europe'–or the world–easily led to outright anti-Americanism, i.e. a radical and reductionist ideology which held the USA responsible for the economic, political, or cultural ilh of modern societies. The war in Iraq in 2003 and the alienation between the USA and France and Germany that followed provided a new impetus for studying the history of European perceptions of America. A large number of studies have since been published that deal with the history of the 'Americanization of Europe' and anti-Americanism, and several monographs, which are based on original research and promise new insights, will be the focus of this historiographical review.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/41349635?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
>>
No. 58252 Kontra
>>58111
I for my part am smug about americans because I frequent imageboards and extrapolate from the audience there :--DDDDDDD
>>
No. 58326
52 kB, 600 × 400
Jesus "Christ" was an advanced extraterrestrial with an agenda, discuss.
>>
No. 58329
>>58116
>More specifically, they used this term to describe the social changes brought about by industrialization and urbanization.
Interesting, this I did not know.
>>
No. 58330
>>58326
That's basically gnosticism amigo
>>
No. 58331 Kontra
>>58326
What's there to discuss? That's exactly what the bible already says.
>>
No. 58332 Kontra
>>58330
>>58331
Kill yourself Ernst

(User was banned for this post)

>>
No. 58333
>>58252
>>58326
Those two posts look great together.
>>
No. 58335
>>58332
That will just feed my soul to the archons. I must find true wisdom first so I can escape this prison planet.
>>
No. 58347
>last two murican posts
>>58112
>>58116
Honestly if I had to see America being better than my country at [insert literally anything] then turned on my computer and had to listen to some fat shitposter act like that and prattle on about [insert literally any satanic pop music UFO vaccines] acting smug to me, I'd probably wake up and go to bed pretty damn butthurt at the world too, in fact I'd probably have taken an insane deal of glee just at seeing [kebab removed from premises] next to any US poster's name at that point.
t. trying to be objective
>>
No. 59134
129 kB, 669 × 998
465 kB, 1277 × 1280
518 kB, 1600 × 1019
51 kB, 600 × 374
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqvTCbDSiJo
Both Capitalism and Communism seem clearly to be dangerously incompetent at this point. Has there been any system in history not retarded? Would a regulated democracy be one of the best? It seems to me that saying at once a John Locke point of view in upholding democracy under the assumption that people on average must be at least somewhat good, competent even, in direct internal contradiction to the basis of free market Capitalism, which is that everybody is inherently greedy, selfish, and out for themselves. It occurred to me the other day that these two fundamental assumptions upholding our neoliberal society are in direct internal contradiction to each other. It seems to me that a Hobbesian view must be best, or at least better suited, to a devolution of John Smith's ideas under such a market liberalist society.

Alternatively, it seems to me that in order to uphold a democracy, it requires some kind of basic assumption as to how people behave as an aggregate economically, that is, they are naturally good or at least not dumb enough their voice and vote shouldn't count, and that therefore some kind of communitarian or mutualist society should work, and that if it does not, then the very basis of democratic assumptions is wrong and therefore the system's superstructure is fundamentally wrong and a farce. I suppose this could be said as to exactly why we have never had a democracy in America nor ever intended to achieve real democracy, and that only giving wealthy white male landowners the vote should matter complete with a bizarre electoral college system to further impede the unwashed masses from ruining things. Perhaps that is why we had free markets with a republican society.

I have not read the Federalist papers and am therefore ignorant as to the arguments Jefferson, Washington, Adams had so I cannot say much on that.

I usually try to ignore this but it really is impossible when I'm watching flight videos and basically it just amounts to "this plane crashed because the airline companyTM wanted to maximize profits by being cheap and greedy" in contrast to Chernobyl tier incompetence. It's also really dampened my enthusiasm over these years seeing more on how the system actually works, including how it's poisoning everything I enjoy like videogaming.

I know there are well read leftists on this board so I guess I'm curious to see their arguments as well moreso from those who chose some third way or read about some historical system that actually worked and didn't routinely get its people killed for rather stupid reasons. I know I am playing with fire simply by asking this, so I really want to emphasise this is not an invite for American shitflinging. Your cultural bs in particular has no relation to the questions I am asking.

How do you set up such a system that it at once requires a fundamental understanding of human nature while also ensuring both liberty and a high degree of competence? How does one best organize and protect his own society, provide highly skilled workers and excellent service, ensure universal liberty, while also ensuring that those freedoms are not exploited by malcontents, ignorants, sociopaths, and callous bean counters?
>>
No. 59202
>>59134
For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administer'd is best:
>>
No. 59367
441 kB, 1502 × 2048
624 kB, 1484 × 2048
649 kB, 1678 × 2048
>>
No. 59375
>>59367
Mysterious asiatic soul. Very impressive.
>>
No. 59377
>>59134
Capitalism is a system that submerges normies into the lifeless consumerist matrix while communism at least gives these people goals and tasks and promotes ideas outside retarded consumption.
Goals such as space exploration, science, art, music, sports, physique. Choose what you like and do what you like.
I think during the cold war a big mistake was that it was about the rat race. Who does what first.
Is it really important that USSR sent the man in space first and the USA sent the man on the moon first? Isn't the fact of such an event happening in the first place is what matters more?
So capitalists have proven they are better at racing and competition, which is by default is the main idea of capitalism. But is it worth winning the race is your horse dies from exhaustion at the end of it like it happened today?
You sold your soul by introducing neoliberalism and what did you win? 30 years of "golden age"? Was it worth it?
I like communism because it's not about speed or efficiency. It's about chill and slow life.
"From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" - now a lot of people say that this is impossible, but for a while we had something like that, during the 60s-70s.
The idea is that if everyone was enlightened, no one would care about that huge ass TV or car or whatever.
In the end the materialist shit does not matter.

Finally i just wanted to say that my post is not about condemning capitalism and promoting communism, but there should be something in the middle really.
I don't know how to call it. Chinese were right in the end i think.
>>
No. 59378
>>59377
>I like communism because it's not about speed or efficiency. It's about chill and slow life.
You lack Bolshevik spirit. It's very much about efficiency.
>>
No. 59379
>>59378
Ok let me rephrase that. When people understand that life is finite they have a lot more energy and willpower to do really impressive things that matter and change the world.
Under capitalism everyone is obsessed with doing things that do not matter, neither for personal growth neither for growth of humans as species.
We all just rotate the hamster wheel in a cage instead of looking for ways to escape the cage.
Or instead of doing fuck all and just chilling.
Not saying that progress is worth it, but still better than working towards that mansion or yacht or whatever material posessions you will lose anyway when you die.
>>
No. 59380
>>59377
Man, I understand that you are trolling fatposters by writing exactly what they want to read. But agree, if someone actually thought like this, that would be hysterically funny. My favorite part is:
> "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" - now a lot of people say that this is impossible, but for a while we had something like that, during the 60s-70s.
>>
No. 59381
>>59380
I'm just sharing the opinion.
If you think i'm incorrect you can go ahead and prove me wrong.
The problem however is that a lot of the Cold War research about the USSR that you can find today on the internet might be fake. Just like a lot of research about the state of the Russian Empire in the USSR.
We will never know what like was like back then, i share my opinion based on what my parents and relatives said about that time.

"Official" statistics might be truth or lie, we will never know. Propaganda always lies, even if it's globalist propaganda.
>>
No. 59382
63 kB, 850 × 525
>>59381
So everything except anecdotal evidence is dismantled as propaganda. OK then.

My grandpa used to ride to Moscow for food. He told me about trains smelling with sausages from far away. You know, you can just buy food and then proceed to non-material things such as thoughts about communism, capitalism, poststructuralism, whatever. But in USSR your mind would be full with thoughts like "They say, meat was thrown out on Lenin's street, need to hurry up and take place in queue as fast as possible".

And speaking about "rat race" and "just chilling". In rotten capitalist west if you are unemployed you get welfare and food stamps. What would you get in Soviet Union? Criminal offense for social parasitism.
>>
No. 59404
1,2 MB, 2220 × 1665
>>59382
>So everything except anecdotal evidence is dismantled as propaganda
Opinions are fine as long as they are not presented as facts. The reason why i dislike democracy is because it promotes the idea that ignorance is just as good as knowledge as long as you have fists to back it up.
There is a very strong cult of anti-intellectualism in the United States which gives losers a boost they do not deserve and gives them the ability to influence politics and stupid people can be easily manipulated because they base their opinion based on feelings rather than logic.
At the same time instead of educating people in schools and universities what they are doing is preventing people from getting proper education by making it paid.
This is rather disgusting if you ask me because it's an open discrimination.
>>
No. 59408
>>59404
>and stupid people can be easily manipulated because they base their opinion based on feelings rather than logic.
This coming from someone who believes the USSR had achieved the Marxist ideal because their grandma told them so.
>>
No. 59410
>>59408
I never said i believe them 100%.
>>
No. 59411
>>59404
But how do you then stop the mechanisms of society being ran by ignorant party man, yes men and other such retards?
>>
No. 59414
487 kB, 791 × 606
>>59411
You can't. It's impossible.
Not even western idea of democracy can fix this, because it eventually degrades into oligarchy.
You just have to accept that one day the society will collapse, the empires rise and fall, it's just the nature of humans.
You can't build the Tower of Babel, an eternal empire that will rule the world forever. It will collapse and split into pieces eventually. Globalist idea is impossible.
Humans will forever be at war with eachother, this is our nature.
And neoliberal capitalism is just a modern form of slavery that is built on lies and giving people an illusion of freedom.
I prefer the system that is not built on lies. It's better when commoners know that they are unlucky but if they really want to change their life and move up the social ladder they can do this. For free. Just go to the university and study. And we need religion as a moral guide for people. It's better when commoners are calm christians than crazy irrational atheists.
I don't know what we will call this system. Christian democracy?
And the new era? Neo-middle age?
>>
No. 59422
113 kB, 250 × 250
>>59414
I didn't expect someone who praises the 70s to have any problem with party yes-men.
>>
No. 59426
>>59422
I prefer stalinism over 70s to be honest.
>>
No. 59428
>>59426
One wonders which was more morally bankrupt. While no doubt the pleasures of advanced socialism would be easier on the heart than the building of socialism, at least Stalinism Leninism remained true to the mission statement.
>>
No. 59435
>>59428
The world we live in right now is morally bankrupt. I can't count the amount of times i have been backstabbed by some reactionary fool.
>>
No. 59451
>>59435
Not if "we" includes myself. In comparison to any decade in Soviet history, I'd live in a moral nation of philosopher kings and heroic free people. The otherwise corrupt and decadent political class of my seaside nation would seem positively selfless and magnanimous by contrast with your party members.
>>
No. 59489
>>59414
>Humans will forever be at war with eachother, this is our nature.
War doesn't originate from some abstract primitive "human nature" bullshit but from economical and political cirumstances which lead to situations where war becomes attractive to the ruling class in order to (try to) resolve competition.
>>
No. 59499
>>59489
It does. In group/out group bias is a fundamental human trait.

The most succesfull modus opreandus of humans is parochial altruism, helping and supporting your own guys while being hostile to the "others".
Its even reflected on a chemical level, oxytocin which makes mothers love their babies also makes people more xenophobic and nationalistic.
>>
No. 59500
>>59489
I'd say the principle of "things that are better at existing keep existing, this includes making other things not exist if they threaten existence" can be described as an abstract metaphysical primitive, and war falls pretty comfortably under that.

Prisoner's Dilemma and all that.
>>
No. 59501
>>59500
I read the prisoners dilemma excludes cooperation, maybe it's just a bad model. Models are not reality anyway.

>>59499
Doesn't it come down to shifting interests more than some abstract human nature?
>>
No. 59505
>>59489
I don't know why you try to argue with slogan-spitting machine.

War is in human nature, no doubt. It's hardcoded in our monkey brains. I think we all loved violent offline games and videogames as boys (haha, and Germans had to play this https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkUuABNnTC0 ).

But humans are good at controlling their primitive instincts. We don't rape each woman we find attractive (at least I don't, what about you?) and don't shit on streets.

At this level of technology wars (at least global ones) are not profitable anymore. First of all, nukes. Second -- global trade.
>>
No. 59507
Wow, this still exists
>>
No. 59514
>>59505
>War is in human nature, no doubt. It's hardcoded in our monkey brains.
War is not the same as violent tendencies in individuals, it's a way more complex scenario.
>>
No. 59515 Kontra
>>59514
There’s instances of monkey tribes doing war against one another for territory and women. So a certain form of war is natural. But I don’t really think it applies to modern European wars.
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No. 59526 Kontra
>>59515
I expected someone would bring this up, but I also think it's different from modern human war. Besides is it even understood why monkey wars occur?
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No. 59530
>>59414
Yknow, I keep wanting to argue against how dumb is so many things in The Walking Dead universe, particularly rather than sober mindedly recognizing the Big Bad overarching universally shared threat that just ended human civilization, rather than routinely using the zombie apocalypse as a weapon against each other as warring tribes, but now after living in America through the pandemic I am not so sure. I am starting to think maybe it was I that was the problem, and that the show or comic creators had a very clear eyed and sober view of humanity from the very beginning. It now makes me think perhaps people like Reagan was wrong from the very start, and that rather than globally uniting against alien invasion all that we would do is take crab bucket mentality of feeding each other to the invading alien hordes even as we end up going extinct as a result of it.

I think it also says something many people would probably be very uncomfortable with admitting, and that is that all the native tribes probably eventually fell to European colonists because all that did was create an opportunity for them evening scores and selling their own neighbors into slavery, becoming informants on their own friends and family, and trying to steer the alien invaders into annihilating their rival tribes instead. I bet you that is exactly what happened both in Africa during the slave trade and also exactly what northern tribes did during Roman expansions.

I think that people are far more petty and stupid than could possibly be believed and the defining mark of leadership is basically just getting people to enlarge the bubble within which they'll stop openly exterminating each other on a death march to shared oblivion. Even so, no leader ever seems able to achieve more than temporary empire where still it eventually becomes impossible to tame those savage lands filled with infighting retards because they're not just too remote but it is too difficult fashioning that many humans into these long polymer chains before disintegrating again.

Now my opinion has changed to where I am convinced in event of alien invasion rather than unite all people will do is band together under different rival sociopaths and find ways to use the shared existential threat as weapon against each other rather than unite to save themselves. It is exactly what has happened under every historic epidemic of which I'm aware.
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No. 59666
874 kB, 1024 × 768
>>59530
I think that you are assuming that Aliens would think like us, and would use Julius Ceasar divide and conquer tactics.
Then again if they are dumb monsters the same would happen probably.
I don't remember where or when but i read an opinion that humans barely evolved past donkeys. At least the overwhelming majority of them.
Otherwise normies wouldn't exist don't you think?
Sure capitalism does make it worse but money existed since god knows when so this retardation is going on for thousands of years now.
Worst part in my opinion is that WE STILL DON'T KNOW HOW TO ENLIGHTEN PEOPLE.
Education does help if you teach them critical thinking skills but it's still a roulette, some people are just hopeless and then there are people who purposefully derail this because they are just scumbags and want to ruin everything.
I hate this blackpill, but are we as a species just going to forever be stuck in the shit?
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No. 59677
>>59666
Well there is always gene editing, which is coming whether we like it or not.

One of my favorite ideas has always been that the greys are actually us tens of thousands into the future, long after we bankrupted the earth and fucked up making wormholes, long after we abandoned the earth and gene editing ourselves to the brink of extinction, and that in search of a new, non-ruined planet to settle, accidentally used some type of singularity technology that instead of bringing us to a distant point in space took us to a distant point in time, which theoretically could work like that.

I was watching something that theoretically if we were to find exotic matter and a way to construct a white hole, that going diagonally across the event horizon could take us to a bent point in time iirc. I forgot how he explained it but that basically when it comes to spooky physics stuff like that that you're interfering in causality on some level anyway? Regardless it is kinda like having to plot an extra spatial dimension to everything we do, like you don't say "meet me at the corner pub" you have to say when to meet you there. We somewhat skip past this because of the way our monkey brains are wired but we're actually plotting a fourth coordinate in all we do. So really the thing is we simply went back in time without plotting the spatial coordinates, you'd be in the deep void of space, because everything is in motion and relative to each other. I think that theoretically because the sun is moving through the galaxy as the galaxy rotates stars around it, where we rotate around the sun, that some random spot millions of years ago without explicitly finding the correct spatial coordinate basically would make you the alien visitor coming to the nearest star from the deep void of space.

Buy anyway yeah this idea always amused me. It's especially because greys kinda look like the direction towards which we've been evolving, particularly if you account for adaptations to low-G low-light environments on a ship or station around some gas giant. So anyway the idea there I think being the theory that if greys were real that they're harvesting us and other things because their genomic tech fucked everything up longterm and now they need some kind of primordial and pure human gene samples to keep themselves going.

But like I said one way or the other this is the tech that actually scares me, because I know that we will do it, I know there will be unforseen consequences, and I know the known dangers are going to be ignored anyway. However it is still nice to dream that out of the many horrors of the Genetic Age directly following the Digital Age that we will at least get some non-bydlo peoples out of it because clearly the problem we have dealt with the entire time is a combination between complex mathematical problems and fundamental human nature problems, and while we can always solve for maths with better organization and system model principles or enhanced technology, we cannot ever solve that fundamental human problem of being a particularly well mannered ape in a cosmonaut suit.

Moreover it doesn't help much that said apes must create a system in which to dwell that not only accounts for but is designed to serve said ape, and that any system designed is going to be able to advance far faster than the ape can ever possibly hope to adapt to it without changing the fundamental nature of the ape.

And so then the problem really becomes, how much of our own native, arguably sacred humanity are we actually willing to pay in the process?

The transhumanists, certain technologists, and the H+ retards all would argue that there is nothing there anyway, which is partly why I refuse to take them seriously, because you cannot deal with a guy doing transactions in your name when he doesn't understand what you're giving him to haggle with has value in the first place. They would have us argue that humans are merely chemical processes and the usual cliches, and that therefore there is no difference between the pre and post-transporter Kirk, or the man or the digitized copy of his brain on some SSD. If we cannot agree to these fundamental premises the argument goes nowhere, which is part of the problem, and also the solution, because diversity of thought and opinion is itself like a memetic fail safe, a kind of meme equivalent to maintaining genetic crop diversity, which usually prevents going too far in any radical changes that we may regret later.

I don't think it is sufficient to be dismissive of normalfags. There is a difference between an ape that watches sitcoms and wants to be like their friends, and someone who is just plain stupid. There is a point to all this, and what we would be losing in that process that frankly isn't our call to make. This bydloness even as an artifact is a fundamental reason why we advanced to total control over life on the planet in the first place, regardless if the autists on here ultimately disdains it either because of bittnerss, or dismissiveness, or just plain ignorance of it. Normalfags act as they do for a reason, and therefore while you may disagree with parts of it like sniffing each other's butts or petty dominance struggles or whatever it is, if the fact remains that it helps form group cohesion and strength it will always be a part of us, even if only vestigial. They work not as one independent thinking mind, but as a unit, regardless if its results are an emergent force of nature or a bunch of lemmings running off a clifffun fact: that phrasing comes from a nature documentary where the humans forced them to march off cliffs for the sake of making the film https://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=wildlifenews.view_article&articles_id=56 Disney company faked it. It made most people believe it. Take that for what you will about human tendency to drink the koolaide

>WE STILL DON'T KNOW HOW TO ENLIGHTEN PEOPLE.
The problem is this requires you being enlightened yourself, and that should be self evident and make people want to come to you, and it is a group effort to begin with. At the same time, that parable about pearls and swine is always going to hold true in relativity with a population, even if you can consistently lift up mean and mode to a much higher point.
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No. 59689
>>59526
Well, the "original" monkey wars, the ones observed by Jane Goodall, arguably occurred over territorial disputes. Some people said that Goodall's feeding station introduced some kind of envy component over that resource, but other instances of monkey wars have been observed from an "invisible" position, so we at least know that monkey wars are, indeed, no consequence of direct human meddling. Of course we can say because we destroy their habitats blablabla, but that can also occur naturally.
So yeah, monkeys do wage war against each other even in their natural state and it's most likely about territory. Early human wars were also about territory, we just got better at it than any other species and with the introduction of philosophy even managed to form motivations that go beyond territory (e.g. islamic expansion, though that was most likely about territory, too lol).
This obversation has also lead some people to believe that war, or the tendency to wage war, is one of the main engines of human development. To me it sounds logical, because it fits right in with our extreme curiosity and greed.

>>59677
>Well there is always gene editing, which is coming whether we like it or not.
But not in our lifetimes. And certainly not in Germany and with disabled people who want their kids to be disabled, too.
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No. 59692
>>59689
I think that the main engine of progress is a competition between selfish and selfless people.
Both invent new things to have an edge over eachother.
Humanity swings from selfish era into selfless era and sometimes there are periods when both exist.
For example classic antiquity is selfish era, middle ages are selfless era, modern times is selfish era.
The periods between these are the best periods because it's when we have the most progress in culture and science.
I am basically citing Lev Gumilyov theory of passionarity but using my own words to describe it.
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No. 59696
>>59689
>it's most likely about territory. Early human wars were also about territory

I dont think that is the point of either those chimpanzee wars nor early human war.
In case of the chimpanzees they mostly had plenty of territory and food resources for both groups. Same goes for early humans.
If you look at both chimpanzee and tribal human warfare it is about another resource, females or more specific wombs.

Chimpanzees systematically exterminate the opposing group with raiding, they kill males one by one until they have the overwhelming number then attack and kill all other except females which havent been pregnant yet, these they integrate into their group.

Similar raiding and capturing of females can be seen in human tribal cultures and human history all over the world, it even left traces in mythology such as the rape of the sabine women.

tl;dr: The resource they are fighting over are wombs, which are most important for their reproductive success.
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No. 59697
>>59696
The Gombe chimp wars were about territory, though. They expanded theirs and were later repelled and lost those territorial gains again. If you are just after women you can more easily just kidnap them.
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No. 59700
543 kB, 1033 × 1280
> orthodox commie for eugenics
Congratulations, you've reached the final level. Now you need to find a place among birch trees you'll know which one, bury yourself there alive and wait until we come. Then you'll realise that it's just a beginning.
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No. 59701
>>59692
>For example classic antiquity is selfish era, middle ages are selfless era,
Wat

How do you figure?
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No. 59702 Kontra
>>59700
are you referring to anyone itt?
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No. 59704 Kontra
>>59702
Yes, to other Russian. OK, now I noticed that post about eugenics was written not by him. Never mind.
>>
No. 59706 Kontra
>>59704
You mean who I expect to be the sociobiologist German? The last thing is, is being a commie.
>>
No. 59753
>>59704
I am post-ideology. I believe in throwing shit at the wall and see what sticks. If it's gonna be monarchy of some sort that works - fuck it, let it stay.
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No. 59760
27 kB, 640 × 360
>>59753
No one is free from ideology
>>
No. 59821
>>59760
That is because we refuse to free ideology from our grasping claws

>>59704
Wasn't Soviet Russia mildly eugenicist at some point? Or was the whole idea of Homo Sovieticus and branding what TPTB didn't like as mental illness all under the assumption people can change from just ideology?
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No. 59824
>>59821
> Wasn't Soviet Russia mildly eugenicist at some point?
How?

> people can change from just ideology
Yes, soviet ideology was a lot about "purely socioeconomic factors" and capitalist environment as root of all criminality and misbehavior.
In addition to that USSR had complicated relations with genetics. In Stalin's epoch it was considered "undialectical" and many scientists were executed or imprisoned.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lysenkoism
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No. 59827
>>59824
I don't think that a lot of people understand why genetics were disliked.
It's not even about genetics threatening the soviet system, i think it's about the fact that through genetics one potentially could revive fascism if he really wanted and have proper "science" to do ethnic cleansing more accurate.
Most people get annoyed at the fact that scientists are being oppressed ignoring the reasons why.
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No. 59828 Kontra
>>59827
Also genetics were attention whores with masochistic tendencies so they liked it and they deserved it. And I know few genetics IRL, they are such bad people. Don't you see the bigger picture like I do? You are so materialistic and superficial!
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No. 59829 Kontra
>>59828
hehehehe
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No. 59843
122 kB, 521 × 868
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/26184/page-images/26184-images.pdf
American manual for their assets in Axis powers on how to sabotage working process.
How many of your colleagues are American spies according to it?
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No. 59845
50 kB, 499 × 379
>>59843
Holy shit, I'm an American spy!
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No. 59846 Kontra
>>59828
Do you feel good when you leave unrelated moronic shitposts? If you don't like this conversation you can simply leave and stop being incredibly emotional about opinions that you do not like.
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No. 59849
573 kB, 1440 × 1080
>>59843
My God, I am myself a saboteur and a wrecker.
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No. 59851
40 kB, 600 × 514
>>59843
Fug, turns out EC is the handler of an international burger sleeper ring.
t. abbarently a gabidalist spy
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No. 59951
1,2 MB, 960 × 992
>>
No. 59958
2,5 MB, 20 pages
>>59851
This is a pretty famous document. That pic is far from the full thing. It is obviously so effective because in part it is almost impossible to distinguish plausible deniability from sheer incompetence with petty workplace subterfuge or active enemy sabotage, so much so that even 70 years later all of us can look at that manual and immediately recognize someone we've known at the office, or hell, any classroom or job period. It's partly why I end up treating outcomes the same regardless if it's through negligence or maliciousness. Alternatively, in an industrial job if you catch someone doing that it wouldn't be that hard to bump them off by staging it as an accident because now everyone is just going to think "oh that guy? Yeah he was one stupid fuck. Doesn't really surprise me a guy that incompetent get himself chewed out in the machinery through his usual carelessness." Downside: they still get one last spectacular display of industrial sabotage on the way out.
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No. 60015
>>58021
>so in the end it was a pointless, expensive digression that brought no benefit to anyone and the Monarchy only went into it because it wanted to look like one of the big boys.)
Look man, if they didn't partake in the crisis they would have lost 50 prestige. It's the Great Power life.

>I'm trying to find books on Hungary-China relations from a cultural standpoint but I just can't seem to come across anything for some reason.
Why would you expect that to be a thing? China spent the last 200 years in forced isolation or internal turmoil, and Hungarians and Chinese had no vested interests in each others' countries. Everyone had contacts with Japan because there were the superstar of Asia.

On the subject of Japan:
https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2021/09/18/the-japanese-as-a-creation-of-the-christian-era/
Turns out there was a second overwhelming demographic wave in Japanese history. Just at the start of the Kofun period, ~300CE, the Yayoi got done the same as they did the Jomon. ~75% of Japanese ancestry dates back to migrants from mainland Asia in this period, presumably Korea.

Japanese and Koreans have been arguing over what relation the countries had in the first millennium for a while, with Japanese claiming (with good evidence) that they had subjugated the south of the peninsula. And perhaps that's true... but it looks likely now that the Japan which was subjugating Korea was founded within recent memory by colonists from Korea. We already know that southern Korea and Japan shared a language at the time, and that there were extremely close political and cultural ties. But this was usually considered a result of shared ancestry dating back to the Yayoi migration, and later trade contacts.

Of course, proto-Japanese, which was originally the language of Korea, got replaced in Korea by the language of Goguryeo. So the Koreans can plausibly claim that Japan is just a Korean colony, while Japanese can claim that they're the last true Koreans. History's fun, isn't it?
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No. 60051
32 kB, 415 × 500
I read this small book about intellectuals and class war. It's a french publication that got translated in 1975 and published by the German Pahl-Rugenstein, which was financed by the GDR.

It's interesting. Comes from the French communist party of that time and the intellectuals are not some french guys like Sartre or Foucault but manly means engineers, technicians, urban planners, and others of the so called "professional class", at least that is a term commonly used today for people that often are also concerned with administering and organizing at their workplace. This book deals with a Marxist analysis of the dawning of what is commonly called a postindustrial society. It was on everyone's lips at the time. The second part deals with the French May of 1968 and the counterrevolutionary actions and ideology of leftist radicals, i.e. libertarians (freedom of the individual from state oppression and capitalism, a form of romanticism), Maoism, trotskyism, and a form of Leninism I did not care to read. It was an interesting read to understand divergence in the left, I know those struggles still appear. Libertarianism is still a common sight tbh. I opened Tiktok after it and oh boy, some standpoints occur again and again in history, if discourse is flora, some standpoints are weed, lel.
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No. 60055 Kontra
>>60051
I love the cover
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No. 60057
>>60051
What did they say about the role of specialists in the coming class war?
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No. 60059
>>60057
They seem to acknowledge capitalism is bad for them. But are stuck due to ideology and for many there occur problems because of a double role they fulfill within their work: they are told to do things and tell people to do things. Which makes it complicated and they cannot be counted as working class, though without production property. Btw. students were counted into it as well. An alliance with the workers is necessary, but the revolutionary subject(s) are others. They do notice that the "intellectuals" are growing fast (some statistics for France are displayed) and will be very important for the fight though. Too bad it fizzled out. I think they did acknowledge well what was going on, but they did not accomplish their goal as we all know.
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No. 60060
>>60055
Yeah, generally those old books can have really cool covers (they aged well A E S T H E T I C) and the best is, they usually are quite cheap. I think it was 1.5€ plus a postal fee. Many of them can still be interesting, it's not too far away timewise and as a source for Zeitgeschichte/contemporary history, they have a stronger bond to the present and can thus be enlightening about the present.
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No. 60063
>>60051
Damn, they really want to work from sharashka =D. Or even better, be beaten to death by Red Guards.
Dealing with well-fed but bored and therefore unsatisfied contrarians is an interesting problem, I wonder how firsties will solve it.
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No. 60065 Kontra
>>60063
What are you even talking about?